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Method Matters:
Statutory Construction Principles and the
Illinois Trade Secrets Act Preemption Puzzle
in the Northern District of Illinois
WILLIAM LYNCH SCHALLER*©+
Appellate methodology makes a difference when it comes to the interplay between statutes and judge-made law. The Illinois Trade Secrets Act
(ITSA) through its preemption provisions abolishes some non-statutory
claims and preserves others, but the line between the two remains a mystery—a mystery of extraordinary importance to those with information not
rising to the level of trade secrets. Illinois state and federal appellate decisions have not improved matters: for over 30 years these appeals courts have
failed to follow standard statutory construction rules and have yet to articulate a rationale justifying their opinions for or against preemption. This
flawed methodology produced nearly 50 Illinois district court published rulings between 1992 and 2014 alone, all unable to agree on a rule of decision—
a stark illustration of why appellate method matters. These appellate deficiencies will continue to confound Illinois district court decisions until the
Illinois Supreme Court weighs in on the ITSA preemption issue, something
that court has never done.
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“Tis all in pieces, all coherence gone.”✝

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Chicago’s federal court, presides over one of the world’s major commercial
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centers.1 It sees its fair share of business litigation as a consequence. Among
other things, the court’s diversity jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction
bring before it trade secret and related business tort claims under Illinois law.2
Indeed, it’s likely these Illinois state law claims will increase in the Northern
District of Illinois given their close relationship with federal claims under the
Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”), the new federal trade secret law Congress passed in 2016.
Proprietary information falls along a continuum in cases of this character. At one end sit true trade secrets—defined as information (1) that derives
its economic value from its relative secrecy and (2) that is subject to reasonable secrecy measures—data fully protectable under the DTSA and its Illinois counterpart, the Illinois Trade Secrets Act (“ITSA”).3 At the other end
sits information not rising to the level of a trade secret yet not in the public
domain. As I’ve explained elsewhere,4 such non-trade secret information
once received and may still receive protection under various Illinois state law
theories—like idea, fiduciary duty, tortious interference and tort of misappropriation law—unless preempted by the ITSA. The DTSA itself does not
* Partner (Retired), Baker & McKenzie, Chicago, Illinois. I would like to thank my
daughter, Alexandra J. Schaller of Loeb & Loeb, for her research and editorial assistance. All
views herein are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of my daughter Ali, Loeb
& Loeb, Baker & McKenzie or their respective clients; in fact, I am no longer a partner, employee or agent of Baker & McKenzie in any way. All errors are mine alone as well.
©2019 William Lynch Schaller. All rights reserved.
+This article is dedicated to my son, William Lynch Schaller, Jr., B.A., Michigan State University, M.B.A. (Candidate), Lake Forest Graduate School of Management, with every good
wish on the start of his career: “We know what we are, but know not what we may be.”
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK, act 4, sc 5, in THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE CAMBRIDGE EDITION 765 (William Aldis
Wright ed., 1936).
✝JOHN DONNE, AN ANATOMY OF THE WORLD, https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/44092/an-anatomy-of-the-world [https://perma.cc/RH6C-BZJP] (originally published
1611).
1
See generally RICHARD CAHAN, A COURT THAT SHAPED AMERICA: CHICAGO’S FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURT FROM ABE LINCOLN TO ABBIE HOFFMAN (Northwestern 2002); Richard Florida, Sorry, London: New York Is the World’s Most Powerful City, https://www.citylab.com/life/2015/03/sorry-london-new-york-is-the-worlds-most-economically-powerfulcity/386315/ [https://perma.cc/UXF5-Y6XP] (March 3, 2015) (ranking Chicago ninth in the
world in 2015 when measured in five categories comprising the so-called Global City Economic Power Index).
2. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151 (1988) (Erie governs diversity and pendent jurisdiction); Houben v. Telular Corp., 309 F.3d 1028, 1032 (7th Cir. 2002)
(“While Erie questions arise most frequently in diversity cases, the Supreme Court has made
clear that the doctrine applies equally to state law claims like Houben's that are brought to the
federal courts through supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.”).
3. See 18 U.S.C. §1839(3); 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. 1065/2(d).
4. See William Lynch Schaller, Illinois Trade Secret Law: The Peculiar Problem of
Preemption, 43 S. ILL. U. L. J. 325, 329-38 (2019).
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figure in this equation; it expressly states that it does not preempt state law
claims.5
Subtle but important issues lurk in this configuration: which Illinois
state law claims are preempted by the ITSA and which are not, and why? The
answers depend upon how courts reconcile competing provisions of the
ITSA. Section 8(a) of the ITSA says that the ITSA preempts all "conflicting
tort, restitutionary, unfair competition, and other laws of this State providing
civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret."6 Section 8(b)(1), on the
other hand, says the ITSA does not affect "contract remedies, whether or not
based upon misappropriation of a trade secret,"7 and Section 8(b)(2) says that
the ITSA does not affect "other civil remedies that are not based upon misappropriation a trade secret."8 As more ITSA trade secret and related Illinois
business tort claims move to federal court under the DTSA, what are judges
sitting in the Northern District of Illinois to make of these ITSA provisions?
To answer this question, I would normally begin with Illinois Supreme
Court decisions, but that court has never addressed the preemption question—or indeed any question—under the ITSA since its passage in 1987. So
in a separate paper I walked through the ITSA preemption decisions of both
the Illinois Appellate Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit.9 I found all but one wanting. As I pointed out there, none set
forth any canons of statutory construction; none supplied any policy reason
for or against preemption; and only one—the Illinois Appellate Court’s decision in Alpha School Bus Company, Inc. v. Wagner–noticed Section 8(a)
and Section 8(b)(2) both use the statutorily defined term “trade secret” to
mark their respective boundaries.10 In fact, only one—the Illinois Appellate
Court’s decision in Wagner—even cited Section 8(b)(2) at all.11
The one case I think was properly reasoned is PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond,12 a 1995 Seventh Circuit opinion holding that Section 8(a) by its terms
preempts common law trade secret claims. Plaintiff prevailed on its statutory
trade secret claim under the ITSA, so the statement in PepsiCo about the
5. See 18 U.S.C. § 1838 (“Except as provided in section 1833(b), this chapter shall
not be construed to preempt or displace any other remedies, whether civil or criminal, provided
by United States Federal, State, commonwealth, possession, or territory law for the misappropriation of a trade secret, or to affect the otherwise lawful disclosure of information by any
Government employee under section 552 of title 5 (commonly known as the Freedom of Information Act).”).
6. 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. 1065/8(a).
7. 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. 1065/8(b)(1).
8. 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. 1065/8(b)(2).
9. Schaller, supra note 4.
10. Alpha School Bus Co., Inc. v. Wagner, 391 Ill. App. 3d 722, 736, 910 N.E.2d
1134, 1149 (1st Dist. 2009).
11. Id. at 736, 910 N.E.2d at 1149.
12. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1271 (7th Cir. 1995).
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ITSA preempting common law trade secret claims was dicta. In any event,
the Seventh Circuit had no need there to cite any statutory construction canons or to provide any rationale for its self-evident preemption ruling. If common law trade secret claims aren’t preempted by the ITSA’s statutory trade
secrets regime, then nothing is and Section 8(a) may as well not exist. There
thus was no reason in PepsiCo to consider the anti-preemption language
found in Section 8(b)(2).
The same cannot be said of the Seventh Circuit’s remaining three ITSA
preemption opinions, however. All of them dealt with non-trade secret claims
and hence all of them squarely confronted questions about Section 8(b)(2)’s
reach and purpose. Composite Marine Propellers, Inc. v. Van Der Woude,13
the first, announced a pro-preemption position in 1992 with respect to all
potential non-trade secret claims without analysis of any kind, simply citing
Section 8(a) and treating this categorical outcome as axiomatic. Hecny
Transportation, Inc. v. Chu,14 the second, reached the right result for the
wrong reasons when handed down in 2005, ruling that claims of corporate
opportunity diversion, fiduciary defalcations, and outright theft of physical
property fell outside Section 8(a)’s pro-preemption clause—without citing or
discussing the directly applicable anti-preemption provision found in Section
8(b)(2), without engaging in any formal statutory construction analysis, and
without realizing its citation to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”) as
persuasive authority was inappropriate in a non-UTSA state like Illinois.15
Spitz v. Proven Winners North America, LLC,16 the third, summarily held in
2014 that “Illinois courts have read the preemptive language in the ITSA to
cover claims that are essentially claims of trade secret misappropriation, even
when the alleged ‘trade secret’ does not fall within the Act's definition.”17
The foundation of Spitz could hardly have been weaker: the parties on appeal
failed to address preemption, Spitz offered no statutory construction analysis,
and Spitz cited nothing more than the Illinois Appellate Court’s opinion in
Pope v. Alberto-Culver Co.,18 a deficient decision that itself offered no statutory construction analysis and simply cited Section 8(a). For better or worse,
the Spitz court’s broad preemption holding has closed the door on all Illinois
non-trade secret information theft theories in federal court under Erie until
the Illinois Supreme Court rules otherwise.

13. Composite Marine Propellers, Inc. v. Van Der Woude, 962 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir.
1992) (per curiam).
14. Hecny Transp., Inc. v. Chu, 430 F.3d 402 (7th Cir. 2005).
15. Id. at 404.
16. Spitz v. Proven Winners North America, LLC, 759 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2014).
17. Id. at 733.
18. Pope v. Alberto-Culver Co., 296 Ill. App. 3d 512, 694 N.E.2d 615 (1st Dist.
1998).
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The timing of Spitz was unfortunate. It eclipsed the late-Judge Shadur’s
fine Northern District of Illinois opinion in 2012 in Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc.,19 where he thoughtfully analyzed Illinois statutory construction
rules and then rejected ITSA preemption of unjust enrichment and fraudulent
inducement claims based upon confidential information not rising to the level
of “trade secrets.” Judge Shadur highlighted the term “trade secret” appearing in Sections 8(a) and 8(b)(2) and its definition in Section 2(d) calling for
economic value due to secrecy and reasonable secrecy measures. This definition, he said, shows that “two kinds of valuable information cannot be trade
secrets: (1) public information, even if valuable in economic terms, and (2)
information as to which a party fails to make reasonable efforts to keep it
secret or confidential.”20 From the ITSA’s use of the defined term “trade secret” he concluded the Illinois General Assembly must have intended to
preempt all non-statutory “trade secret” claims through Section 8(a) and to
preserve all non-trade secret claims through Section 8(b)(2). Given this statutory construction analysis, he had no difficulty rejecting Pope as “unreasoned and unreasoning”21 as part of his Erie effort to predict the Illinois Supreme Court’s likely ITSA preemption view. Judge Shadur even ventured a
policy reason for his anti-preemption ruling in Miller—uniformity with other
states that have adopted the UTSA.22 Unfortunately, his policy position was
wrong on two counts: (1) Illinois is not a UTSA state, as he acknowledged in
passing in footnote 5 in Miller,23 and (2) the ITSA has no “uniformity”
clause, a key fact he overlooked.24
19. Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar Inc., 859 F. Supp. 941, 942 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
20. Id. at 944.
21. Id. at 945.
22. Miller UK, 859 F. Supp. at 947 (“It must be remembered that, as with all efforts
by the Commissions on Uniform Laws, the goal here was to persuade state legislatures to
standardize an area of law in place of their varying jurisprudential approaches—an important
goal in a national economy that does not come to a halt at state borders. In this instance the
Act has sought to promote a single statutory definition of a ‘trade secret.’ It then provides (1)
a set of rights for the holder of such an asset and (2) a set of remedies when these rights are
violated.”).
23. Id. at 946, n.5.
24. Most commentators also overlook these and other important distinctions that set
Illinois apart from other states. See, e.g., Robert C. Denicola, The New Law of Ideas, HARV. J.
L. & TECH. 195, 204-18 (2014) (citing the ITSA and discussing certain ITSA preemption
cases, including Judge Shadur’s opinion in Miller UK v. Caterpillar, without noting the
ITSA’s omission of the “uniformity” clause and without discussing Illinois statutory construction principles); Richard F. Dole, Jr., Preemption of Other State Law by the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act, 17 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 95, 99, 111-14 (2014) (briefly discussing the ITSA
and certain ITSA preemption cases without noting the ITSA’s omission of the “uniformity”
clause and without discussing Illinois statutory construction principles); Warrington S. Parker,
III & Daniel D. Justice, The Differing Approaches to Preemption under the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act, 49 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L. J. 645, 655. 658-59 (2014) (citing the ITSA and
discussing certain ITSA preemption cases without noting the ITSA’s omission of the
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My purpose here is not to take sides on the ITSA preemption question.
I did that in my earlier paper, where I argued Judge Shadur’s reasoning and
result were clearly correct and far superior to the Illinois state and federal
appellate ITSA preemption opinions before and after Miller that skipped
standard statutory construction methodology and then made matters worse
by offering no policy reasons for or against preemption. My purpose here is
instead to show my sympathy for Judge Shadur and the other Northern District of Illinois judges who had to wrestle with these confused and confusing
appellate precedents. As I toured the Northern District of Illinois cases for
my earlier paper, I realized their experience with ITSA preemption provided
a rare opportunity to analyze the impact of appellate methodology on lower
courts over a quarter century. Indeed, it presented the law equivalent of a
scientific controlled study: the district court and the question remained the
same; only Seventh Circuit precedent changed.
So I decided to embark on the present paper with the modest aim of
showing what happens when reviewing courts fail to follow first principles.
For analytic clarity, I divide the Northern District of Illinois cases by reference to then-extant Seventh Circuit ITSA preemption opinions to demonstrate how each lower court struggled to find some principled basis for decision but could not because of the appellate opinion flaws just noted or because they overlooked these appellate opinions and then failed to follow first
principles themselves. Thus, Part I and Part II focus on Northern District of
Illinois cases decided before and after the Seventh Circuit’s 1992 opinion in
“uniformity” clause and without discussing Illinois statutory construction principles); Ashley
Dillon, An Immodest Proposal: How the Kansas Supreme Court Can Unify the Uniform Trade
Secret Act’s Preemption of Common Law Claims, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 1147, 1155, 1171 (2012)
(briefly discussing the ITSA and certain ITSA preemption cases without noting the ITSA’s
omission of the “uniformity” clause and without discussing Illinois statutory construction
principles); Charles Tait Graves & Elizabeth Tippett, UTSA Preemption and the Public Domain: How Courts Have Overlooked Patent Preemption of State Law Claims Alleging Employee Wrongdoing, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 59, 65, 67, 68, 74, 82, 104 (2012) (citing the ITSA
and certain ITSA preemption cases without noting the ITSA’s omission of the “uniformity”
clause and without discussing Illinois statutory construction principles); John T. Cross, UTSA
Displacement of Other State Law Claims, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 445, 449 (2010) (discussing
the ITSA and many ITSA cases but cautioning: “While this Article does consider many cases
from Illinois, and some from California, it is important to keep in mind the differences in
language of §7 may affect the way the court resolves the [preemption] issue.”); Julie Piper, I
Have a Secret?: Applying the Uniform Trade Secrets Act to Confidential Information That
Does Not Rise to the Level of Trade Secret Status, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 359, 37778 (2008) (citing the ITSA and discussing certain ITSA preemption cases without noting the
ITSA’s omission of the “uniformity” clause and without discussing Illinois statutory construction principles); Robert Unikel, Bridging the “Trade Secret” Gap: Protecting “Confidential
Information” Not Rising to the Level of a Trade Secret, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 841, 884-86
(1998) (citing the ITSA and discussing certain ITSA preemption cases without noting the
ITSA’s omission of the “uniformity” clause and without discussing Illinois statutory construction principles).
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Composite Marine Propellers. Part III tracks Northern District of Illinois rulings (plus four Central District of Illinois cases, in the interest of thoroughness25) in the wake of Seventh Circuit’s 2005 opinion in Hecny Transportation. Part IV then reviews Northern District of Illinois decisions (and one
Central District of Illinois opinion26) after the Seventh Circuit’s 2014 opinion
in Spitz. Once Spitz arrived, of course, the lower courts ceased searching, as
they must in our hierarchal court system,27 even though the illogic of the appellate precedents was apparent to at least two district court judges.28
Part V offers some concluding thoughts about the lessons learned from
these cases, the upshot of which is that method matters in appellate adjudication. In the end, we are left with nearly 50 federal district court decisions
on ITSA preemption, not one of which–other than Judge Shadur’s Miller
opinion–offered a policy reason for or against preemption. The predictable
result was ad hoc adjudication; these Northern District of Illinois (and Central District of Illinois) district court judges seldom could divine what the
Seventh Circuit wanted them to do as new claims came before them, leaving
unlucky litigants to their fate. Bad reasoning makes bad law, to be sure.29
I. FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT OPINIONS BEFORE COMPOSITE
MARINE PROPELLERS
District court opinions before Composite Marine Propellers are a good
place to start in a “state of nature” sense, that is, opinions that lacked any
appellate guidance at all. The first and only such opinion appears to have
25. See Arvegenix, LLC v. Seth, 2014 WL 1698374 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 2014)
(McDade, J.); Tradesmen Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 2011 WL 5330589 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 2011)
(Bernthal, M.J.); EBI Holdings, Inc. v. Butler, 2009 WL 400634 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 17, 2009)
(Scott, J.); Jano Justice Systems, Inc. v. Burton, 2008 WL 5191765 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 11, 2008)
(Mills, J.).
26. See First Financial Bank, N.A. v. Bauknecht, 71 F. Supp.3d 819 (C.D. Ill. 2014)
(McDade, J.).
27. See Reiser v. Residential Funding Corp., 380 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2004) (“In
a hierarchical system, decisions of a superior court are authoritative on inferior courts . . .
[D]istrict judges must follow the decisions of this court whether or not they agree.”).
28. See Market Track, LLC v. Efficient Collaborative Retail Marketing, LLC, 2015
WL 3637740 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2015) (Tharp, J.); Cronimet Holdings, Inc. v. Keywell Metals,
LLC, 73 F. Supp.3d 907 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (Ellis, J.).
29. See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 890
(2006) (“Once a court announces a reason for its decision, and once that stated reason is something that future or lower courts are expected to take seriously as a reason, then the troubling
question still arises as to whether the general statement that is the reason is better or worse by
virtue of it having been initially announced in the context of a concrete dispute that a court is
expected to resolve.”) (footnotes omitted); Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 633, 637 (1995) (“But whatever the hierarchy between reason and authority, reasons are
what we typically give to support what we conclude precisely when the mere fact that we have
concluded is not enough.”).
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been Ace Novelty Company, Inc. v. Vijuk Equipment, Inc.,30 decided in 1990
by Judge Kocoras on a motion to dismiss. Ace Novelty claimed it shared with
Vijuk Equipment its ideas about “soft tickets” for gaming and a special machine to produce them, only to have Vijuk later assert that the soft ticket design belonged to Vijuk. Ace Novelty offered no serious ITSA preemption
analysis. It simply noted section 8(a)’s pro-preemption clause without citing
section 8(b)(2)’s anti-preemption clause and then made the following assertion without any citation at all: “[t]he preemption provision is an indication
of the outer limit of Illinois’ protection of intangible property.”31 As a busy
district court lacking appellate precedent, the Ace Novelty court’s cursory approach was understandable but hardly a model for later cases. As an interesting aside, Ace Novelty was the only case the parties would later cite in the
1992 appeal in Composite Marine Propellers, and the Seventh Circuit ignored it with good reason.
II. FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT OPINIONS AFTER COMPOSITE
MARINE PROPELLERS
Chicago Show Printing Co. v. Sherwood32 was not much better than
Ace Novelty. In that case Chicago Show sued former employee Sherwood
“for conversion of invention,”33 and Sherwood raised preemption on a motion to dismiss. It was unclear to the court whether Chicago Show was alleging that Sherwood had “converted his idea or the actual machine he had
built.”34 As to the “idea” claim, Judge Leinenweber simply stated that it appeared to have been preempted by the ITSA.35 The court offered no analysis
or citation to authority beyond its generalized citation to Section 8. Even
though Sherwood was decided on July 14, 1992, and docketed on July 20,
1992, the court did not discuss or even cite the Seventh Circuit’s broad ITSA
preemption holding in Composite Marine Propellers, which was decided on
May 4, 1992.
The next decision to consider preemption, issued in 1993, was
EarthDweller, Ltd. v. Rothnagel.36 In that case Judge Marovich considered
preemption of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims. Specifically,
EarthDweller claimed fraud based upon false representations that enabled the
30. Ace Novelty Co., Inc. v. Vijuk Equipment, Inc., 1990 WL 129510 (N.D. Ill. Aug.
31, 1990) (Kocoras, J.).
31. Id. at *3-*4.
32. Chicago Show Printing Co. v. Sherwood, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10843 (N.D. Ill.
July 20, 1992) (Leinenweber, J.).
33. Id. at *7.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. EarthDweller, Ltd. v. Rothnagel, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16531 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
22, 1993) (Marovich, J.).
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Rothnagels to develop their own competing business in lieu of acting as
EarthDweller’s licensee. The “breach of fiduciary duty” count claimed unjust
enrichment based on the allegation that Samuel Rothnagel breached his duty
to use confidential information entrusted to him solely for EarthDweller’s
benefit as EarthDweller’s business consultant. On the Rothnagels’ motion to
dismiss, the court held there was no preemption, emphasizing Section 8(a)’s
use of the words “conflicting” and “misappropriation of trade secrets” and
then observing: “[b]y its very terms, the Illinois Trade Secret Act precludes
only conflicting causes of action for misappropriation of trade secrets, and
not those claims which allege more than mere misuse or misappropriation of
trade secrets.”37 While hardly a polished analysis, EarthDweller at least
reached the right result for the right reason: it read Section 8(a) as limited to
a select class of claims, namely those based upon trade secret misappropriation. The court cited no decisions in support of its holding, however, nor did
the court mention the sweeping pro-preemption language found in the Seventh Circuit’s 1992 per curiam opinion in Composite Marine Propellers38—
“[u]nless defendants misappropriated a (statutory) trade secret, they did no
legal wrong.”39
Cohn v. Taco Bell Corp.40 followed in early 1994. Cohn involved a franchise fight in which plaintiff claimed unfair competition by Taco Bell in allegedly misappropriating plaintiff’s confidential information in the form of
“an extensive site study regarding appropriate locations for two new Taco
Bell restaurants in the north and northwest suburbs of Chicago.”41 Taco Bell
attacked both the unfair competition count and a related trade secret count,
arguing on a motion to dismiss that the ITSA preempted the unfair competition claim and that plaintiff failed to allege reasonable secrecy measures in
support of its ITSA misappropriation claim. Judge Nordberg cited Composite
Marine Propellers and Section 8—without noting Section 8(b)(2)’s antipreemption language—and held the unfair competition claim was preempted
because “Illinois ha[d] abolished all common law theories of misuse of confidential information with the passage of the Illinois Trade Secrets Act.”42
The district court did not notice that Section 2(d)’s definition of “trade secret,” requiring reasonable secrecy measures, operated to limit Section 8’s
preemption language to misappropriation based upon “trade secrets,” as opposed to “confidential information.” Ironically, the district court then went
on to dismiss the ITSA misappropriation claim as well, for failure to allege
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at *21.
Composite Marine Propellers, 962 F.2d at 1265.
Id.
Cohn v. Taco Bell Corp., 1994 WL 13769 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 1994) (Nordberg,

41.
42.

Id. at *9.
Id. at *10.

J.).
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confidentiality measures as required by Section 2(d) with respect to the site
plan, even though the district court had conceded that “the site information
was not generally known, publicly available information” for purposes of the
dismissed unfair competition claim.43 In other words, the distinction between
confidential information and trade secrets was lost due to preemption of an
otherwise valid claim.
A similar result obtained in a later 1994 case, Venango River Corp. v.
NIPSCO Industries, Inc.44 That case centered on the collapse of the Chicago
South Shore Railroad, which was owned and managed by Venango River
Corp. After securing a nondisclosure agreement, Venango shared South
Shore information and some Venango information with one of South Shore’s
largest customers, Indiana utility NIPSCO, in an effort to persuade NIPSCO
to invest in South Shore. NIPSCO declined, South Shore went bankrupt, and
then Venango and NIPSCO became competing bidders for South Shore’s assets, with NIPSCO prevailing. Venango subsequently sued NIPSCO for trade
secret theft and for “breach of fiduciary duty” based upon the nondisclosure
agreement between South Shore and NIPSCO.45 On NIPSCO’s motion for
summary judgment, Judge Williams ruled that Venango lacked standing to
bring its trade secret misappropriation claim because South Shore rather than
Venango owned South Shore’s trade secret information.46 She also ruled that
NIPSCO did not “misappropriate” South Shore’s information since if
NIPSCO had used it at all, NIPSCO had used it for the very purpose South
Shore had intended–to acquire South Shore.47 More important for our purposes, the court also held that Venango’s breach of fiduciary duty claim
against NIPSCO was preempted “because it [was] predicated on the existence of a trade secret,”48 citing Section 8(a) of the ITSA and Composite Marine Propellers without mentioning Section 8(b)(2)’s anti-preemption language.

43. Id. at *10.
44. Venango River Corp. v. NIPSCO Industries, Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17898
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 1994) (Williams, J.).
45. The district court acknowledged disclosure of trade secrets to a potential purchaser can create a fiduciary duty, citing Cloud v. Standard Packaging Corp., 376 F.2d 384,
388-89 (7th Cir. 1967) (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §757, comment j (1939), and holding
that duty of confidence may arise where one should have known disclosure was made in confidence). Venango River, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17898, at *24-25.
46. Id. at *29-30 (citing and quoting Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26
(1987) (“Confidential information acquired or compiled by a corporation in the course and
conduct of its business is a species of property to which the corporation has the exclusive right
and benefit.”)).
47. Id. at *30-31.
48. Id. at *24.
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Web Communications Group, Inc. v. Gateway 2000, Inc.49 followed Venango River a few months later. Promotional marketing and print production
management company Web over about six months arranged 15 print jobs for
Gateway for a total of $2.5 million dollars, and then the parties began discussing the concept of a “stepped insert” for Gateway ads. Web only spent
three or four hours developing the “stepped insert” idea. Gateway considered
the idea but then went with another printing firm, Quebecor Printing. When
Gateway through Quebecor released ads using stepped inserts, Web sued
claiming “implicit confidentiality”50 as well as unjust enrichment. Judge Aspen on summary judgment rejected Web’s trade secret claim for lack of secrecy measures, holding that an industry custom of secrecy was not shown
and that reliance on such a custom, alone, was insufficient under the ITSA.51
In granting a separate motion to dismiss directed at the unjust enrichment
claim, the court quoted both section 8(a) and 8(b) and held that the unjust
enrichment claim was preempted “to the extent directed at trade secret misappropriation,”52 citing Venango River. However, the court in Web Communications then proceeded to address plaintiff’s claim that even if its “stepped
insert” did not qualify as a trade secret, it had a reasonable expectation of
being awarded jobs arising from its “developmental work” and hence had a
cause of action for unjust enrichment.53 While the Web Communications
court rejected this claim on the merits,54 it plainly assumed that the unjust
enrichment claim before it was not preempted by the ITSA—a distinction
later lost on the Illinois Appellate Court in Pope when it cited Web Communications as its sole authority in support of its overbroad unjust enrichment
preemption holding that Judge Shadur would roundly criticize in Miller in
2012 and the Seventh Circuit would uncritically accept in Spitz in 2014.
In early 1996, about a year after Web Communications, Judge Conlon
granted a preemption motion to dismiss in J.H. Chapman Group, Ltd. v.

49. Web Communications Group, Inc. v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 316 (N.D.
Ill. 1995) (Aspen, J.).
50. Id. at 320.
51. Id. The district court did not have the benefit of the Seventh Circuit’s subsequent
decision in Hicklin Engineering, LC v. Bartell, 439 F.3d 346, 350 (7th Cir. 2006) (implied
undertaking to abide by trade norms of secrecy constitutes sufficient secrecy measures).
52. Id. at 321.
53. Id.
54. The Web Communications court held that where preliminary services are rendered to gain a business advantage with the hope of securing a contract, without any reasonable anticipation on the part of either party “that reimbursement will directly result, quasi-contractual relief [in the form of unjust enrichment] is unwarranted.” Web Communications, 889
F. Supp. at 321 (quoting Van C. Argiris & Co. v. FMC Corp., 144 Ill. App. 3d 750, 755, 494
N.E.2d 723, 727 (1st Dist. 1986)).
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Chapman.55 Chapman broke away from J. H. Chapman Group, an investment
banking firm he had founded, to form a rival of the same name with his son.
J.H. Chapman Group took the news poorly and brought a variety of claims,
including trade secret theft, breach of confidential relationship, and breach of
fiduciary duty. On a motion to dismiss, the district court sustained the trade
secret claim but ruled that the “confidential relationship” count was
preempted, citing Section 8(a) and Composite Marine Propellers. J.H. Chapman was pursuing a trade secret theory, the court observed, regardless of its
reference to it as “commercially valuable information.”56 J.H. Chapman’s
separate “breach of fiduciary duty” claim met the same preemption fate for
the same reason.
Precision Screen Machines Inc. v. Elexon, Inc.57 appeared six months
after Chapman. Like Venango River, Precision Screen Machines also involved confidential information exchanged in connection with a potential
business sale. In this instance, somewhat simplified, Elexon signed a sophisticated nondisclosure agreement that required it to use all confidential materials solely for the possible purchase and to return all confidential materials
upon demand. Alleging that Elexon retained some of the confidential materials after Precision demanded their return and that Elexon used those materials to Precision’s detriment, Precision claimed breach of the nondisclosure
agreement, trade secret misappropriation, and “tortious breach of their confidential relationship.”58 Judge Nordberg agreed that retention of the materials after their return was demanded constituted misappropriation under the
ITSA, but he found the breach of confidential relationship claim preempted
by the ITSA and therefore granted that portion of Elexon’s motion to dismiss.
As had become typical by this point, the court engaged in no statutory construction analysis and did not mention the anti-preemption language found in
Section 8(b)(2). It simply cited Web Communications and Chapman and then
observed that preemption was warranted because the confidential relationship claim “was a common law claim for misappropriation of trade secrets.”59
Thermodyne Food Service Products, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp.,60 another 1996 decision, offered a slight twist on the preemption issue in foreshadowing the Seventh Circuit’s Hecny Transportation opinion nine years
later. The convoluted facts of the Thermodyne summary judgment opinion
showed that Thermodyne designed and manufactured ovens using its trade
55. J.H. Chapman Grp., Ltd. v. Chapman, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2256 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
28, 1996) (Conlon, J.).
56. Id. at *8.
57. Precision Screen Machines Inc. v. Elexon, Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12487
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 1996) (Nordberg, J.).
58. Id. at *3-*4.
59. Id. at *13.
60. Thermodyne Food Serv. Products, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 940 F. Supp. 1300
(N.D. Ill. 1996) (Alesia, J.).
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secret technology, technology consisting of a combination of elements not
susceptible to reverse engineering. McDonald’s, a major customer, began secret discussions with a Thermodyne executive, Lieberman, apparently for the
purpose of establishing an alternative source of supply for ovens using the
same technology. When Lieberman departed Thermodyne, so did McDonald’s, but Thermodyne eventually caught on as a result of a trade show and a
magazine article suggesting McDonald’s had acquired Thermodyne’s oven
technology. Judge Alesia denied the defense motion for summary judgment
on Thermodyne’s trade secret claim, ruling among other things that Thermodyne’s president and project manager both possessed sufficient industry experience to qualify as experts able to testify about whether Thermodyne’s
technology was known within the industry.61 The court then offered a relatively nuanced preemption discussion of Thermodyne’s fiduciary duty claim
against Lieberman. It explicitly followed Composite Marine Propellers as
well as Venango River and Chapman in holding that the fiduciary claim was
preempted to the extent it rested on Lieberman’s theft of Thermodyne’s technology.62 However, the court cautioned that the fiduciary claim could survive
to the extent it was “premised on conduct other than the misappropriation of
the Thermodyne technology.”63 Thermodyne thus became the first opinion to
recognize that preemption does not automatically apply just because stolen
information is at issue in some way.
For fans of the field, Judge Shadur’s 1997 summary judgment opinion
in Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc.64 was a tour de force in trade secret analysis from
a style standpoint, reflecting his distinctive narrative skill, elegant expression, and comprehensive bent, but his ITSA preemption approach was uncharacteristically pedestrian. Nilssen, a litigious inventor and former employee Motorola fired in 1972,65 approached Motorola about his inventive
efforts in electronic ballast for fluorescent lighting. The negotiations were
61. Id. at 1306.
62. This holding later became the basis for the Illinois Appellate Court’s rejection of
McDonald’s attempt to establish “advertising injury” insurance coverage for Thermodyne’s
claims. See McDonald’s Corp. v. Am. Motorist Ins. Co., 321 Ill. App. 3d 972, 986, 748 N.E.2d
771, 783-84 (2d Dist. 2001) (holding that judicial estoppel doctrine precluded McDonald’s
effort to establish “cloud on title” and “unfair competition” as bases for insurance coverage,
as McDonald’s persuaded the district court in Thermodyne to dismiss those claims or their
equivalents as preempted by the ITSA).
63. Id. at 1309.
64. Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (Shadur, J.).
65. Id. at 667, 669 (noting Nilssen’s firing in 1972 and Motorola’s concerns about
“his history of sending Motorola unsolicited material” and “his possible litigiousness”).
Motorola’s concerns were prescient: Nilssen’s battles with Motorola continued through at
least 2001, and his battles with others continued through at least 2007. See Nilssen v.
Motorola, Inc., 255 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 2001); Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 504 F.3d 1223
(Fed. Cir. Oct. 2007).
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characterized by “fits and starts” and multiple nondisclosure agreements,66
but in the end the parties could not agree on partnership or licensing terms.
Pursuant to the nondisclosure agreements, Nilssen demanded the return of
his materials and Motorola claimed it complied. When Motorola later entered
the ballast lighting business, allegedly through its independent development
efforts,67 Nilssen brought patent, trade secret, confidential relationship, and
unjust enrichment claims. On ITSA preemption of the last two, however,
Judge Shadur had very little to say beyond quoting from Composite Marine
Propellers and citing Precision Screen and Web Communications.68 Obviously, Judge Shadur’s two-paragraph, pro-preemption analysis in Nilssen
stands in stark contrast to his forceful and extended anti-preemption opinion
15 years later in Miller, with the Seventh Circuit’s intervening Hecny Transportation decision in 2005 only partially explaining his change of heart.
The year 1997 did bring a major development nearly a decade after the
ITSA passage, however: Combined Metals of Chicago Limited Partnership
v. Airtek, Inc.,69 a district court opinion that actually read the ITSA's preemption provision in its entirety and gave life to its anti-preemption clause in
Section 8(b)(2). There Airtek gave its steel fabrication design and die specifications to its supplier, Combined Metals, to manufacture catalytic converters pursuant to an agreement that did not address confidentiality. Combined
Metals developed a die for Airtek but then began using that die to make catalytic converter shells for competitors of Airtek without Airtek’s knowledge.
Airtek demanded return of the die and design specifications; Combined refused to return them; Combined Metal sued for unpaid invoices; and Airtek
counterclaimed for breach of fiduciary duty and trade secret theft.
The case came before the court on Combined Metals’ motion to dismiss
arguing ITSA preemption. Judge Alesia, who authored Thermodyne just one
year before, acknowledged Thermodyne in Combined Metals and conceded
that Section 8(a) of the ITSA “clearly preempts all common law claims that
are based on the misappropriation of a trade secret.”70 However, he then became the first judge to note explicitly that the Section 8(a) by its terms limits
preemption to claims based on “misappropriation of a trade secret,” while
Section 8(b)(2) expressly states that the ITSA has no effect on claims not
66. Nilssen, 963 F. Supp. at 681, n. 19.
67. In a later opinion in the Miller case, Judge Wood did not use the term "clean
room" to describe Motorola's defense. In a later opinion in the case, Judge Wood offered an
extensive “clean room” discussion in analyzing the admissibility of expert testimony under
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See Miller UK Ltd. v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 2015 WL 10818831 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 2015) (Wood, J.).
68. Nilssen, 963 F. Supp. at 683-84.
69. Combined Metals of Chi. Ltd. P’ship. v. Airtek, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Ill.
1997) (Alesia, J.).
70. Id. at 830.
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based on “misappropriation of a trade secret.”71 He did so because Airtek
argued that if its information did not qualify as a trade secret, Airtek wanted
to fall back on its breach of fiduciary duty allegations resting on the confidential relationship between Airtek and Combined Metals.72 Judge Alesia
recognized the logic of Airtek’s argument based upon a comparison of Section 8(a) and Section 8(b)(2):
Thus, in the instant case, if the Airtek die and design specifications fail to qualify as a trade secret, how could the
breach of fiduciary duty count be preempted under the
ITSA? Again, the ITSA preempts only counts premised on
the misappropriation of a trade secret. Thus, if the Airtek die
and specifications is not a trade secret or secrets, the ITSA
preemption provision is inapplicable. Accordingly, the
breach of fiduciary duty count will remain in this action for
now.73
Interestingly, Judge Alesia acknowledged Composite Marine Propellers later in his opinion when he addressed the complaint's failure to identify
with specificity the trade secrets at issue, yet he omitted the broad preemption
statement found in that Seventh Circuit opinion: “[u]nless defendants misappropriated a (statutory) trade secret, they did no legal wrong.”74
Learning Curve Toys, L.P. v. PlayWood Toys, Inc.75 offered another
preemption dispute two years after Combined Metals, this time on summary
judgment. Unable to replicate the train-track sound they wanted for the famous Thomas the Tank Engine toy, Learning Curve Toys approached PlayWood Toys, and PlayWood quickly came up with a novel solution: it carved
angled grooves in the tracks to produce the desired "clickity-clack" sound
and created a prototype. The parties could not come to terms, however, and
Learning Curve thereafter patented the track, leading PlayWood to bring various claims, including trade secret theft, "idea misappropriation," and unjust
enrichment. To defeat ITSA preemption, PlayWood argued (much like the
71. Id. The court in EarthDweller made the same point about Section 8(a) but did not
explicitly examine or quote Section 8(b)(2).
72. Id. Judge Alesia expressed doubt about the validity of Airtek's confidential relationship claim, noting that ordinarily parties to a contract do not owe each other fiduciary
duties and that for trust and confidence to be reposed, one side must prove it was heavily
dependent upon the advice of the other—circumstances he thought were not present based
upon the complaint alone. Id. at 830, n.3.
73. Id. (footnotes omitted).
74. Composite Marine Propellers, Inc. v. Van Der Woude, 962 F.2d 1263, 1265 (7th
Cir. 1992).
75. Learning Curve Toys, L.P. v. PlayWood Toys, Inc., 1999 WL 529572 (N.D. Ill.
July 20, 1999) (Pallmeyer, J.).
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counter-plaintiff in Combined Metals before it) that its trade secret theft and
idea misappropriation claims presented distinct causes of action, with its idea
claim surviving if its trade secret claim failed.76 Judge Pallmeyer marshalled
the usual precedents in favor of preemption, such as Composite Marine Propellers, Precision Screen, and Thermodyne,77 and even became the first Illinois court to cite commentary in the field,78 although she curiously omitted
any reference to what was then the most recent case on preemption addressing the very same argument, Combined Metals. From these authorities the
district court in Learning Curve Toys concluded the ITSA “eliminated common law claims based on conduct which might support an ITSA action.”79
Judge Pallmeyer then teased a new Illinois rule from these authorities: “if the
operative facts are arguably cognizant under the ITSA, any common law
claim that might have been available on those facts in the past now no longer
exists in Illinois.”80 This “stricter”81 preemption rule almost proved disastrous when Judge Pallmeyer later took away PlayWood's $6 million jury verdict for trade secret theft,82 breathing new life into the question of whether
information not rising to the level of a trade secret can be protected under
non-ITSA theories. The Seventh Circuit never reached the preemption issue,
however, as it reinstated the jury's verdict on ITSA grounds.83
The following year brought the hesitant summary judgment decision in
Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp.84 That 1998 dispute arose when employee Wimmer jumped ship from Thomas & Betts to competitor Panduit,
76. Id. at *2.
77. Id. at *3.
78. Id. (citing Robert Unikel, Bridging the "Trade Secret" Gap: Protecting "Confidential Information" Not Rising to the Level of Trade Secrets, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 841 (1998)
and ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS, §1.01[4], at 1-68.14 (1996)).
79. Learning Curve Toys, 1999 WL 529572, *3.
80. Id. This new Illinois rule was apparently derived from Roger Milgrim's treatise,
as the Learning Curve Toys court quoted it a few paragraphs earlier in its opinion. Learning
Curve Toys, at *3 (quoting Powell Products, Inc. v. Marks, 948 F. Supp. 1469, 1474 (D. Colo.
1996) (dicta) (preemption appropriate under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act where "'other
claims are no more than a restatement of the same operative facts which would plainly and
exclusively spell out only trade secret misappropriation'") (quoting ROGER M. MILGRIM,
MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS, §1.01[4], at 1-68.14 (1996)).
81. Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. PlayWood Toys, Inc., 2002 WL 391361, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 14, 2002).
82. Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. PlayWood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 721 (7th Cir.
2003) (noting the district court granted Learning Curve Toys' Rule 50 motion to set aside the
jury's verdict); Learning Curve Toys, 2002 WL 391361 (opinion and order granting Rule 50
motion); Learning Curve Int’l v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP, 392 Ill. App. 3d 1068, 1072, 911 N.E.2d
1073, 1077 (1st Dist. 2009) (describing the verdict as “about $6 million” and noting later
settlement was for over $11 million).
83. Learning Curve Toys, 342 F.3d at 716.
84. Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 108 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Ill. May 2,
2000) (Moran, J.).
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taking with him his former employer's "computers, disks and documents"
along with trade secret sales and related information stored on those physical
items.85 In addition to its trade secret claims, Thomas & Betts alleged breach
of fiduciary duty, conversion, unfair competition, tortious interference, conspiracy, fraud, and Illinois Consumer Fraud Act claims. Relying on Composite Marine Propellers, Thermodyne, Chapman, Venango, Learning Curve
Toys, Cohn, Sherwood, and Ace Novelty, Judge Moran in Thomas & Betts
ruled that all of these business tort claims were preempted by “Section 8.”86
The court acknowledged the tension between these pro-preemption opinions
and the anti-preemption holdings in EarthDweller and Combined Metals, but
sought to distinguish those cases on procedural grounds, noting they were
decided on motions to dismiss whereas Thomas & Betts came for decision on
summary judgment.87 The court turned aside Thomas & Betts' breach of fiduciary duty and conversion claims tied to the stolen “computers, disks and
documents” on the additional ground that “these physical items have little
value apart from the information contained therein.”88 As to Thomas & Betts'
argument “that preemption [wa]s improper because the confidential information taken by Wimmer may not rise to the level of a trade secret,”89 the
district court responded: “this theory would render Section 8 meaningless,
for it would forbid preemption of state law claims until a final determination
has been made with respect to whether confidential information rises to the
level of a trade secret.”90 The district court did not elaborate on this nonsequitur, as it thought the question moot in light of Learning Curve Toys and
the sweeping holding in Composite Marine Propellers, the latter of which
the Thomas & Betts court quoted. Still, the court was obviously troubled by
Thomas & Betts' “information not rising to the level of a trade secret” argument, as the court ended with this observation: “[w]e are not unmindful of
the concerns raised by T&B, but point out that T&B's confidentiality

85. Id. at 970.
86. Id. at 972-74. The Thomas & Betts court became the first to dismiss an Illinois
Consumer Fraud Act claim on preemption grounds, quoting Section 8(a)'s language displacing
"conflicting tort, restitutionary, unfair competition, and other laws of this State providing civil
remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret." Id. at 975, n. 3 (emphasis in original) (quoting
ILCS 1065/8(a)).
87. Id. at 972, n. 1.
88. Id. at 973, n. 2. The court distinguished Sherwood on the notion that the converted
physical invention there presumably had more value than the items converted in Thomas &
Betts. Of course, as we now know, the Seventh Circuit would later take a very different view
in Hecny Transportation, holding that the breach of fiduciary duty claim there, resting on
stolen "files, computers, software, and other office equipment," was not preempted. Hecny
Transp., 430 F.3d at 404.
89. Thomas & Betts, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 972.
90. Id. at 972-73.

212

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39-2

agreement with Wimmer and its concomitant breach of contract claim remain
intact and provide adequate protection with respect to this issue.”91
A few more district court cases took up preemption before Hecny Transportation, but they resist easy description. For example, Bagley v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.,92 an idea theft opinion Judge Bucklo issued in
2000 just a few weeks after Thomas & Betts, nowhere mentioned Thomas &
Betts—or for that matter, any decision for or against preemption—in denying
a motion to dismiss. Emphasizing that the express language of the Section
8(a) only preempts “conflicting” laws that provide remedies for misappropriation of “trade secrets,” Judge Bucklo allowed Bagley's unfair competition
and stolen idea claims to stand.93 By contrast, about a year later in AutoMed
Technologies, Inc. v. Eller,94 on “jumping ship” facts largely similar to those
in Thomas & Betts, Judge Moran, the author of Thomas & Betts, granted a
preemption motion to dismiss for the most part and dispensed with breach of
fiduciary duty, conversion, conspiracy, and tortious interference claims.95
Only breach of fiduciary duty claims resting on corporate opportunity usurpation and employee solicitation facts survived; these claims, the court ruled,
did not share the same facts as the software and design plans that formed the
core of the trade secret misappropriation claim.96 And just a month after AutoMed, Judge Reinhard in Seaga Manufacturing, Inc. v. Fortune Metal, Inc.97
issued a terse opinion dismissing unfair competition, fraud, and deceptive
trade practice claims as preempted since all three were premised on the theory that machine-builder Fortune misappropriated Seaga’s “confidential proprietary information” concerning the design and manufacture of Seaga’s machines and its customer information.98 He did allow tortious interference
claims for solicitation of an employee and a customer to withstand preemption, however, evidently because they were not rooted in the trade secret scenario. Judge Reinhard in Seaga cited no authority for these holdings, although they paralleled the rulings in AutoMed. Master Tech Products, Inc. v.
Prism Enterprises,99 a 2002 decision by Judge Andersen on summary
91. Id. at 973.
92. Bagley v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 100 F. Supp.2d 879 (N.D. Ill. 2000)
(Bucklo, J.).
93. Id. at 883-84.
94. AutoMed Techs., Inc. v. Eller, 160 F. Supp.2d 915 (N.D. Ill. July 2001) (Moran,
J.).
95. Id. at 921-22 ("Breaching a duty of loyalty by using confidential information is
still misappropriation of a trade secret.").
96. Id. at 921, 925.
97. Seaga Mfg., Inc. v. Fortune Metal, Inc., 2001 WL 1196184 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10,
2001) (Reinhard, J.).
98. Id. at *2.
99. Master Tech Prods., Inc. v. Prism Enters., 2002 WL 475192 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26,
2002) (Andersen, J.).
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judgment motions that relied on Composite Marine Propellers and Learning
Curve Toys and found the ITSA preempted Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, Illinois Antitrust Act, and common law fraud claims relating to confidential
information exchanged in the course of unsuccessful business sale negotiations. And Fox Controls, Inc. v. Honeywell Inc.,100 yet another preemption
motion to dismiss opinion, issued in 2002 by Judge Grady, followed Thomas
& Betts and similar decisions (AutoMed, Learning Curve Toys, Nilssen,
Thermodyne, Chapman, Web Communications, and Ace Novelty) in ruling
that all allegations amounting to claims that Fox Controls misused Honeywell's confidential information were preempted. Pleading in the alternative
was not permitted in light of Composite Marine Propellers, Learning Curve
Toys, AutoMed, and Thomas & Betts, the court ruled. 101
The distinction between claims dependent on stolen information and
claims grounded on other conduct continued to emerge in the last three federal court ITSA preemption decisions before Hecny Transportation. The first
of these, Lucini Italia Co. v. Grappolini,102 decided in 2003, was the most
interesting because it also was the first Illinois case since Composite Marine
Propellers to consider preemption after a merits trial (Judge Pallmeyer had
approved preemption on summary judgment in Learning Curve Toys). The
somewhat convoluted facts there involved “a breach of loyalty and theft of
valuable trade secrets by a highly paid consultant to a small family business
engaged in the sale of olive oil.”103 Just before trial defense counsel withdrew, and then defendants themselves failed to appear at trial. Magistrate
Judge Denlow conducted a bench trial without them and found defendants
wrongfully seized an exclusive contract with a key supplier for their own
benefit and began marketing a new product by means of misappropriated
trade secrets. The court therefore awarded breach of fiduciary duty damages
of $4.17 million for lost profits and $1 million in punitive damages for the
diverted exclusive supply agreement, the same lost profits and punitive damages for fraud, the same lost profits for promissory estoppel, and the same
lost profits and punitive damages—plus $800,000 in development costs–for
trade secret misappropriation. These awards, plus attorneys’ fees and costs,
brought the total award to just under $6,762,000, and the court also granted
a permanent injunction against use of the misappropriated olive oil secrets.104
The court revisited its earlier motion to dismiss ruling that had permitted Lucini’s non-ITSA claims to stand (on the possibility that they were "based on
100. Fox Controls, Inc. v. Honeywell Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15663 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 22, 2002) (Grady, J.).
101. Id. at *7-8.
102. Lucini Italia Co. v. Grappolini, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7134 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 28,
2003) (Denlow, M.J.).
103. Id. at *1.
104. Id. at *68-69.
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something more than the trade secret misappropriation")105 and found, after
trial, “that the facts relating to the breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and promissory estoppel claims are inextricably linked to the trade secret claim.”106
The court therefore ruled that all damages were provided under the trade secret count, noting that the other awards were only made in the event the trade
secret judgment did not survive on appeal.107
Lucini Italia was followed in 2004 by Judge Pallmeyer’s second effort
at preemption in Do It Best Corp. v. Passport Software, Inc.,108 a case mainly
noteworthy for its trade secret subject matter: computer program source code.
Do It Best licensed software from Passport Software, later tried to evade the
license by creating derivative software based on Passport Software’s code,
and then lied about the origin of its new code—by pretending it obtained the
code from RealWorld—to avoid paying royalties under the Passport Software license. Do It Best brought a declaratory judgment action and Passport
counterclaimed for copyright infringement, ITSA trade secret misappropriation, fraud, and tortious interference based on a separate license agreement
between Passport Software and RealWorld. Much like her earlier preemption
decision in Learning Curve Toys,109 Judge Pallmeyer’s opinion in Do It Best
took a broad view of preemption and found Passport Software’s fraud counterclaim preempted because “it merely restate[d] its trade secret misappropriation claim,” citing Thomas & Betts.110 She distinguished Thomas & Betts
in upholding the tortious interference counterclaim before her; however, “unlike plaintiff in Thomas & Betts, PSI alleges that DIB interfered with its relationship with a licensor of software (RealWorld), as well as with PSI’s relations with its existing customers, rather than DIB’s alleged misappropriation of trade secrets.”111
Judge Aspen, who authored the 1995 summary judgment opinion in
Web Communications, also revisited the preemption question in 2004 in Dick

105. Id. at *65. See also Lucini Italia Co. v. Grappolini, 231 F. Supp.2d 764 (N.D. Ill.
2002) (Denlow, M.J.) (collecting authorities for and against preemption and denying preemption on fiduciary duty, fraud, constructive fraud, and unjust enrichment claims to the extent
that they are not “inextricably intertwined” with ITSA claims); Lucini Italia Co. v. Grappolini,
288 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir. 2002) (reversing district court’s denial of preliminary injunction).
106. Id. at *66.
107. Id.
108. Do It Best Corp. v. Passport Software, Inc., 2004 WL 1660814 (N.D. Ill. July 23,
2004) (Pallmeyer, J.).
109. Judge Pallmeyer did not cite her Learning Curve Toys preemption opinion, although she did cite the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. PlayWood,
Inc., 342 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 2003). Do It Best, 2004 WL 1660814, at *10.
110. Id. at *10.
111. Id. at *20.
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Corp. v. SNC-Lavalin Constructors, Inc.,112 this time on a motion to dismiss.
Somewhat simplified, in 1999, Dick and NEPCO entered into a joint venture
agreement that provided the joint venture itself would exclusively own all
drawings and other intellectual property related to the Kendall County Generation Facility they were to build, and Dick ended up owning all intellectual
property once NEPCO withdrew from the joint venture. In 2002, defendants
SLCI and PCL used the joint venture's drawings (which they had apparently
received through NEPCO) on a power plant facility in Dixon, Illinois, so
Dick sued SLCI and PCL for copyright infringement, trade secret misappropriation, tortious interference and conversion. Without citing his prior
preemption opinion in Web Communications, Judge Aspen granted SLCI's
and PCL's preemption motions to dismiss the tortious interference and conversion counts “to the extent that these counts [we]re premised upon the misuse of confidential information, but [h]e den[ied] the motions to the extent
that these counts [we]re premised upon alleged solicitation of employees.”113
Citing Composite Marine Propellers, AutoMed and Thomas & Betts, Judge
Aspen ruled that the tortious interference and conversion claims were
preempted so far as they relied “on misappropriation or misuse of ideas.”114
He then expressly rejected Dick's attempt to distinguish between unlawful
possession of tangible documents and misuse of ideas in those documents,
citing AutoMed and Thomas & Betts in holding that “in cases where the value
of a claim stems primarily from the ideas contained within items rather than
their tangible forms, the ITSA preempts the claim.”115 He did uphold the tortious interference claim against preemption to the extent it alleged wrongful
solicitation of Dick’s employees, however.116
Ironically, just as all momentum seemed to favor blanket preemption
when the same facts merely could give rise to a trade secret misappropriation
claim, along came the 2005 opinion in Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. v.
Carter,117 where Judge St. Eve rejected a preemption motion to dismiss a few
months before Hecny Transportation. The egregious facts there showed a
Schwab information technology employee, on the verge of losing his job,
unilaterally decided he could keep his employer’s trading trade secrets because Schwab was closing his unit, the Schwab Soundview Capital Markets’

112. Dick Corp. v. SNC-Lavalin Constructors, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26767
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 2004) (Aspen, J.).
113. Id. at *32.
114. Id. at *33.
115. Id. at *33.
116. Id. at *34.
117. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. v. Carter, 2005 WL 2369815 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27,
2005) (St. Eve, J.).
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Investment Analytics Division (“IA”).118 Focusing on Schwab’s allegations
that Carter copied “15,000 computer files from Schwab’s network,” that he
emailed to his new employer Acorn “confidential information . . . relating to
certain of the outside data sources used in IA’s models,” and that “Carter
copied and removed confidential information from Schwab’s offices,”119 the
district court refused to dismiss Schwab’s claims for conversion, breach of
fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment.120 The district court stressed that the “plain terms” of Section 8(a)
operate to preempt only “conflicting” laws that provide remedies “for misappropriation of a trade secret”121 and observed that a court must first determine whether the separate claim “seek[s] recovery for wrongs beyond the
mere misappropriation.”122 The district court then summoned the antipreemption decisions in EarthDweller, Combined Metals and Bagley and
noted the forgiving language in Lucini Italia, AutoMed, Thomas & Betts, Web
Communications and Learning Curve Toys before concluding: “[t]aken
118. See, e.g., Lynne Marek, What Will It Take to Beat the Boss?, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS.,
July 27, 2015, at 14 (discussing the multiple trading and investment firms founded by exemployees of Chicago-based Citadel, including Chicago-area firms Magnetar, Anchor Bolt
Capital, Alyeska Investment Group, Castle Creek Arbitrage, Gladius Capital Management,
Chicago Fundamental Investment Partners, and Teza Capital Management); Bradley Hope,
Speedy Trader Seeks to Slow Critics, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2014, at C1 (discussing high-frequency trading firm Hudson River Trading, “one of the most active trading firms in the world,
accounting for more than 5% of U.S. stock transactions on most days.”); United States v.
Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2012) (reversing high-frequency trading computer specialist
Sergey Aleynikov’s federal trade secret theft conviction); Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp.,
Inc., 765 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2014) (analyzing advancement/indemnification fight between
Aleynikov and Goldman Sachs arising out of Aleynikov’s state and federal criminal prosecutions for allegedly stealing Goldman Sachs’ high-frequency trading code); People v. Aleynikov, 31 N.Y.3d 383, 104 N.E.3d 687, 79 N.Y.S.3d 583 (2018) (upholding Aleynikov’s conviction for uploading proprietary software code in violation of New York statute prohibiting
“tangible reproduction or representation” and unlawful “intent to appropriate . . . the use” of
secret scientific material); Citadel Inv. Grp., LLC v. Teza Tech, LLC, 398 Ill. App. 3d 724,
924 N.E.2d 95 (1st Dist. 2010) (civil litigation arising out of Aleynikov’s attempt to join Teva
Technologies); Citadel Investment Grp., LLC v. Teza Technologies, LLC, 2009 WL 3416124
(Cir. Ct. Cook Cty., Ill., 2009) (Rochford, J.) (fining Teza Technologies’ founder Mikhail
Malyshev $2 million for computer evidence destruction); Courtney Comstock, Court Fines
Citadel’s Mikhail “Misha” Malyshev $1.1 Million Despite Genius Porn-Addict Defense,
https://www.businessinsider.com/mikhail-misha-malyshev-porn-hft-citadel-2010-10
[https://perma.cc/L3TS-GQ8G] (Oct. 19, 2010) (reporting court’s rejection of Malyshev’s
home computer “scrubbing” defense: “‘I am addicted to hard-core internet pornography and
wiped my hard-drive clean to save myself the embarrassment of being examined about the
forensic details of my addiction.’”).
119. Id. at *5.
120. Id.
121. Id. at *4 (quoting ITSA, 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. 1065/8).
122. Id. (quoting EarthDweller, Ltd. v. Rothnagel, 1993 WL 487546, *7 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 22, 1993)).

2019]

METHOD MATTERS

217

together, it is reasonable to infer that within the downloaded files, the emailed information, and other information removed from Schwab’s office,
Carter acquired proprietary and confidential information that could give rise
to common law liability, even if that information does not constitute a fullblown trade secret.”123
III. FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT OPINIONS AFTER HECNY
TRANSPORTATION CO. V. CHU
Coincidently, the first district court case to confront the Seventh Circuit’s restrictive 2005 preemption opinion in Hecny Transportation was
Judge St. Eve's 2005 decision in C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. Command
Transportation, LLC,124 and her tune changed accordingly. Loeb sold his
business to freight logistics firm C.H. Robinson and later joined competitor
Command Transportation; eventually software developer Harrison, another
C.H. Robinson employee, joined Loeb at Command Transportation. Loeb
and Harrison developed a new software program for Command Transportation that competed with C.H. Robinson’s logistics software, and C.H. Robinson sued for trade secret theft, unfair competition, conversion, fraud, conspiracy and a constructive trust. On a motion to dismiss, Judge St. Eve
viewed the crucial inquiry under Hecny Transportation as whether the claims
were “dependent on the misappropriation of a trade secret.”125 She then determined that alleged use of C.H. Robinson’s confidential information underpinned all of C.H. Robinson’s non-ITSA claims and therefore dismissed
them as preempted, except for the conversion count, as the factual allegations
supporting that claim were unclear.
As it happened, the next preemption case also came before Judge St.
Eve, as reflected in her 2006 decision in Systems America, Inc. v. Providential Bancorp, LTD.126 Greatly simplified, System America initially provided
services and later supplied software to defendant Providential in exchange
for a promised ownership stake in Providential. Providential reneged on its
part of the deal yet retained Systems America’s software, prompting Systems
America’s trade secret and conversion claims. Judge St. Eve denied Providential’s motion to dismiss Systems America’s trade secret claim but granted
123. Id. at *5 (citing Bagley v. Lumbermens Cas. Mut. Co., 100 F. Supp. 2d 879, 884
(N.D. Ill. 2000), for “denying motion to dismiss common law misappropriation and unfair
competition claims because the ITSA preemption provision did not preclude alternative assertion that stolen business plan was not actually a trade secret.”).
124. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. Command Transp., LLC, 2005 WL 3077998
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2005) (St. Eve, J.).
125. Id. at *6.
126. Systems America, Inc. v. Providential Bancorp, LTD., 2006 WL 463314 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 24, 2006) (St. Eve, J.).
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it as to the conversion claim on ITSA preemption grounds. As the author of
Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. v. Carter127 just five months before, Judge St.
Eve was of course familiar with the preemption issue, but she evidently
thought Hecny Transportation simplified her task and dictated a different
outcome in Systems America. Quoting the passage from Hecny Transportation in which the Court of Appeals noted that “the dominant view is that
claims are foreclosed only when they rest on the conduct that is said to misappropriate trade secrets,”128 and citing AutoMed for its software conversion
claim preemption holding,129 Judge St. Eve ruled Systems America’s software conversion claim was preempted because it rested solely on Providential’s misappropriation of the software.130 She did not mention the possibility
that under her Charles Schwab decision, Systems America’s conversion
claim could stand if its software did not rise to the level of a trade secret, nor
did she attempt to square this aspect of Charles Schwab with Hecny Transportation.
Dominion Nutrition, Inc. v. Cesca,131 rendered by Judge Hart less than
a week later in 2006, omitted any reference to Systems America while attempting to hew to Hecny Transportation. Dominion Nutrition was a variation on Lucini Italia: a business consultant, Cesca, became president of Dominion Nutrition but then used his secret company, Global Nutrifoods, to
usurp a corporate opportunity, namely the McDonald’s relationship Dominion Nutrition was trying to foster. Dominion Nutrition brought two counts
against Cesca for breach of fiduciary duty—one for attempting to dissuade
McDonald’s from doing business with Dominion Nutrition, and one for attempting to persuade McDonald’s to go with his firm, Nutrifoods—and a
third count against him for tortious interference with business expectancy in
taking away the McDonald’s opportunity. The district court opened by citing
Hecny Transportation and noting that “[p]ublished opinions of the Illinois
state courts have not construed §8 with any specificity.”132 It then canvassed
pre-Hecny Transportation district court opinions to show two different
preemption approaches had emerged, one standing for the rule that “if the
operative facts are arguably cognizable under the ITSA, any common law
claim that might have been available on those facts in the past now no longer
exists,” as set forth in Judge Pallmeyer’s Learning Curve Toys opinion, and
127. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. v. Carter, 2005 WL 2369815 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27,
2005) (St. Eve, J.).
128. Systems America, 2006 WL 463324, at *6 (quoting Hecny Transportation, 430
F.3d at 404-05).
129. Id. at *18.
130. Id.
131. Dominion Nutrition, Inc. v. Cesca, 2006 WL 560580 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2006)
(Hart, J.).
132. Id. at *3.
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a second espousing the rule that “there is no preemption unless the tort involves ‘misuse of secret information,’ that is, misappropriation of an actual
trade secret,” as stated in Judge Moran’s AutoMed opinion. The district court
then quoted at length from Hecny Transportation, including the Seventh Circuit’s statements that “misappropriation of a trade secret differs from other
kinds of fiduciary defalcations, which the statute therefore does not affect”
and that “[a]n assertion of trade secret in a customer list does not wipe out
claims of theft, fraud, and breach of the duty of loyalty that would sound even
if the customer list were a public record.”133 The district court in Dominion
Nutrition therefore denied Cesca’s summary judgment motion seeking
preemption of the fiduciary duty and tortious interference claims, observing
pointedly that “[i]t need not be proven that Cesca relied on any confidential
information.”134
Judge Bucklo, the author of Bagley, re-entered the preemption fray in
2007 with a brief opinion in Abanco Int’l, Inc. v. Guestlogix Inc.135 Abanco,
an inventor and provider of payment processing services and systems such
as debit and credit card processing, entered into a confidentiality agreement
with Guestlogix, a supply chain management firm serving the hotel industry.
Pursuant to this agreement, Abanco provided “a valuable and proprietary system” for processing in-flight credit card transactions and sales and inventory
information. Together they approached American Airlines about an electronic buy-on-board system. Abanco’s proposal was rejected, but
Guestlogix’ later proposal was accepted, prompting Abanco’s action charging Guestlogix with theft of Abanco’s proprietary system. Judge Bucklo
weighed Guestlogix’ preemption motion to dismiss in light of Hecny Transportation, noting at the outset that Abanco conceded its non-ITSA claims
were preempted to the extent they were dependent upon misappropriation of
trade secrets. Judge Bucklo agreed with Abanco that preemption was improper to the extent Abanco’s claims concerned “information which does not
133. Id. at *4 (quoting Hecny Transportation, 430 F.3d at 404-05).
134. Id. For those interested in the ultimate outcome of the case, Cesca won after a
bench trial before Seventh Circuit Judge Posner, who was sitting by designation. Judge Posner
ruled that Cesca (1) did not violate his non-disclosure agreement, (2) did not violate his fiduciary duties during his short stint as head of Dominion Nutrition, (3) did not profit from his
wrong, if he engaged in wrongdoing at all, and (4) did not cause Dominion Nutrition's injuries,
because McDonald's would not have dealt with Dominion Nutrition in any event. See Dominion Nutrition, Inc. v. Cesca, 467 F. Supp.2d 870 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (Posner, J.). The last of these,
based on McDonald’s supposed refusal to deal with Dominion, is open to question as a legal
matter. See William Lynch Schaller, Corporate Opportunities and the Third Party “Refusal
to Deal” Defense: Policy and Practice Lessons from Illinois, 47 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1 (2013)
(arguing that the third-party refusal to deal defense should be rejected as a matter of law and
policy in Illinois corporate opportunity cases).
135. Abanco Int’l, Inc. v. Guestlogix Inc., 486 F. Supp.2d 779 (N.D. Ill. 2007)
(Bucklo, J.).
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rise to the level of a trade secret.”136 Judge Bucklo cited Hecny Transportation for this proposition, and she also quoted Section 8(b)(2)’s anti-preemption language earlier in her opinion. Judge Bucklo apparently thought her
previous preemption decision in Bagley was irrelevant in light of Hecny
Transportation, as she did not cite Bagley.
A more probing analysis appeared subsequently in 2007 in RTC Industries, Inc. v. Haddon,137 where Judge Grady, the author of Fox Controls, Inc.
v. Honeywell Inc.,138 again struggled with the extent of fiduciary duty
preemption, this time guided by Hecny Transportation. The rather unique
facts there presented every company's worst nightmare: RTC vice president
Haddon was hired by its competitor DCI with the understanding he would
eventually become DCI's president, but even before leaving RTC he began
serving DCI's interests by warning DCI that a DCI employee, Schipke, was
in the process of jumping ship to RTC.139 “This was news to DCI, as Schipke
had not yet notified DCI he had accepted RTC's offer.”140 DCI confronted
Schipke and Schipke rescinded his acceptance of RTC's offer, and RTC then
sued Haddon for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of his employee confidentiality agreement, and trade secret misappropriation. On Haddon's Rule 12(c)
judgment on the pleadings motion asserting ITSA preemption of the fiduciary duty claim, the RTC Industries court opened its analysis of Hecny Transportation by noting it was “unclear how broadly to apply the Seventh Circuit’s decision.”141 It then carefully parsed Hecny Transportation, quoting
the Court of Appeals’ statement that “the dominant view is that claims are
foreclosed only when they rest on the conduct that is said to misappropriate
trade secrets,”142 language the RTC Industries court took to mean “there are
still some instances where the ITSA will preempt a fiduciary duty claim.”143
After quoting the Dominion Nutrition court’s observation that Hecny Transportation “narrowly construed” the ITSA’s preemptive effect,144 the court in
RTC Industries rejected the pre-Hecny Transportation decision in Learning
Curve Toys as too strict in demanding preemption whenever “the operative

136. Id. at 781.
137. RTC Industries, Inc. v. Haddon, 2007 WL 2743583 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2007).
138. Fox Controls, Inc. v. Honeywell Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15663 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 22, 2002) (Grady, J.).
139. See Sue Shellenbarger, Bye, Boss, Let’s Stay Friends Forever: Dreams of Pounding the Desk and Shouting About All That Went Wrong; How to Make the Final Day at a Job
Less Awkward, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2015, at D1 (noting that salesmen and other employees
quitting to join competitors are often asked to leave immediately).
140. Fox Controls, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15663, at *1.
141. Id.
142. Id. (emphasis in original).
143. Id.
144. Fox Controls, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15663, at *3.
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facts are arguably cognizable under the ITSA.”145 Judge Grady instead announced a new rule in RTC Industries: “After Hecny Transportation, the test
for a non-ITSA claim is not whether the plaintiff arguably could have brought
an ITSA claim. Rather, the test is whether the plaintiff’s claim would lie if
the information at issue were non-confidential.”146 Concluding RTC’s fiduciary duty claim would have been valid even if RTC had taken no steps to
keep Schipke’s hiring confidential, the RTC Industries court rejected
preemption.147 The court in RTC Industries buttressed its ruling by citing the
Illinois Appellate Court’s opinion in Hill v. Names and Addresses, Inc.148 as
an example of an Illinois state court opinion “concluding that the confidentiality of information shared with a competitor is not relevant to a claim for a
breach of the duty of loyalty.”149 Thus, RTC Industries rejected Learning
Curve Toys in light of Hecny Transportation and concluded that RTC did not
“arguably plead itself out of court by alleging Schipke’s imminent departure
was confidential.”150
I pause to ponder Judge Kocoras' 2008 opinion in Universal Imagine
Print Group, LLC v. Mullen151 before turning to another 2008 decision weeks
later, CardioNet, Inc. v. Life Watch Corp.152 The misappropriation facts in
Universal Imagine Print were simple: an employee copied certain print jobs
just weeks before resigning, and his employer then discovered that all of the
employee's print and electronic data were missing from his office and computer. Judge Kocoras' ruling was equally simple: the fiduciary duty claim
concerning missing information was not preempted because, “[i]f the information does not qualify as a trade secret, the availability of civil remedies
designed to address unlawful disclosure or use would be unaffected by the
ITSA.”153 Judge Kocoras did not cite his earlier (and contrary) decision in
Ace Novelty Company, Inc. v. Vijuk Equipment, Inc.,154 nor did he cite Hecny
Transportation or any other case. Even so, Judge Kocoras' straightforward

145. Id. (quoting Learning Curve Toys, 1999 WL 529572, at *3). Judge Grady did not
mention his own pre-Hecny Transportation preemption opinion in Fox Controls, where he
had followed Learning Curve Toys.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Hill v. Names and Addresses, Inc., 212 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 1076, 571 N.E.2d 1085,
1091 (1st Dist. 1991).
149. Fox Controls, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15663, at *3.
150. Id.
151. Universal Imagine Print Group, LLC v. Mullen, 2008 WL 62205 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
4, 2008) (Kocoras, J.).
152. CardioNet, Inc. v. Life Watch Corp., 2008 WL 567223 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2008)
(Conlon, J.).
153. Universal Imagine, 2008 WL 62205, at *3 (citing 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. 1065/8(b)).
154. Ace Novelty Co., Inc. v. Vijuk Equip., Inc., 1990 WL 129510 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31,
1990) (Kocoras, J.).
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analysis—relying exclusively on the plain language of Section 8(b)—was as
refreshing as it was correct.
CardioNet, on the other hand, was far more intricate factually and analytically. CardioNet, a heart monitoring device manufacturer, supplied Mobile Cardiac Outpatient Telemetry ("MCOT") devices to patients, but their
use of the devices was only by physician prescription and was subject to several contractual restrictions: (1) they were to return the device to CardioNet
immediately after usage ceased, (2) they were to use the MCOT solely for
heart monitoring, and (3) they were to refrain from tampering, reverse engineering, or transferring the device to third parties. Life Watch, a CardioNet
competitor, acquired two CardioNet MCOTs by obtaining false prescriptions
for two Life Watch employees, Lehman and Ament, and then by having them
falsely agree to the usual CardioNet use restrictions. Thereafter, Life Watch
employee Lehman faked a heart attack using a cardiac stimulator, causing
the MCOT to signal CardioNet's monitoring center. CardioNet subsequently
discovered the scheme and sued, arguing Life Watch had improperly acquired the MCOT kits to obtain CardioNet's proprietary data. As one might
guess, in addition to its ITSA claim, CardioNet brought conversion, fraud,
unfair competition and interference with contract claims against Life Watch.
In her preemption analysis, Judge Conlon, the author of J.H. Chapman
Group, Ltd. v. Chapman,155 opened with Hecny Transportation and drew
from it that preemption applies when non-trade secret claims rest on the same
conduct as trade secret claims, but “does not apply to duties imposed by law
that are not dependent upon the existence of competitively significant information.”156 Judge Conlon therefore ruled that claims based on theft of the
MCOT kits themselves escaped preemption while claims based on theft of
the information within the MCOT kits did not. Accordingly, the conversion
and fraud claims fell to the extent they rested on information misappropriation, as did the unfair competition claim that “inextricably” depended on the
allegation that defendants “possess[ed] and use[d] . . . information obtained
from examination and testing of the two MCOT kits.”157 The conversion and
fraud claims were allowed to stand as they related to the improperly acquired
MCIT kits themselves. The tortious interference claim was also allowed to
stand: “[t]he tort alleged here is not the misappropriation of a trade secret,
but rather the interference with Lehman and Ament’s underlying contract
with CardioNet.”158 Interestingly, Judge Conlon cited Judge Kocoras’
155.

J.H. Chapman, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2256 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 1996) (Conlon,

J.).
156. Id. at *2 (quoting Hecny Transportation, 430 F.3d at 405).
157. Id. at *3-5.
158. Id. at *5. The district court cited for support the Seventh Circuit’s decision rejecting preemption of a tortious interference claim in IDX Sys. Corp. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 285 F.3d
581, 586-87 (7th Cir. 2002) (Wisconsin law). Id. at *5.
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Universal Imagine Printing opinion in setting forth the ITSA’s definition of
“trade secret” but otherwise ignored it in CardioNet,159 even though Universal Imagine Printing was contrary to her preemption holdings. Indeed, she
even cited Charles Schwab for its anti-preemption holding: “[c]laims not
based on trade secret misappropriation are permissible.”160 Yet, like Judge
St. Eve in Systems America, Judge Conlon in CardioNet did not mention the
possibility that under Charles Schwab, CardioNet’s conversion, fraud and
unfair competition claims could stand if CardioNet’s MCOT data did not rise
to the level of a trade secret, nor did Judge Conlon attempt to reconcile this
aspect of Charles Schwab with Hecny Transportation.
Days after Judge Conlon’s CardioNet opinion, Judge Lefkow examined
ITSA preemption in another software case, Integrated Genomics, Inc. v.
Kyrpides, this time with a stunning anti-preemption outcome.161 Although
the case involved the topical subject of software for analyzing genomes,162
the operative facts were of the more prosaic “jumping ship” variety with a
wrinkle: the Joint Genome Institute hired away two of competitor Integrated
Genomics’ top employees—Director of Bioinformatics and genetic software
developer Kyrpides and his research scientist assistant Ivanova—as part of
an apparent mass raid.163 An added wrinkle was the lack of a trade secret
159. J.H. Chapman, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2256, at *3.
160. Id. at *2.
161. Integrated Genomics, Inc. v. Kyrpides, 2008 WL 630605 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2008)
(Lefkow, J.).
162. On software development in general, see Christopher N. George & Raymond Millien, Protecting IP in an Agile Software Development Environment, LANDSLIDE MAGAZINE,
Vol. 7, No. 6, at 34 (July/Aug. 2015) (comparing traditional software development to “agile”
software development and discussing intellectual property challenges posed by agile development, including trade secret and nondisclosure agreement issues); PETER J. BENTLEY,
DIGITIZED: THE SCIENCE OF COMPUTERS AND HOW IT SHAPES THE WORLD at 218-32 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2012) (discussing “bioinformatics” and how it impacts biology and medicine). On
biotech development in general and genetic research in particular; see EDDY D. VENTOSE,
PATENTING MEDICAL AND GENETIC DIAGNOSTIC METHODS (Edward Elgar Publishing 2013)
(extended patent law discussion of treatment regimes, diagnostic methods and genetic diagnostic methods); JENNIFER DOUDNA & SAMUEL H. STERNBERG, A CRACK IN CREATION: GENE
EDITING AND THE UNTHINKABLE POWER TO CONTROL EVOLUTION (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt
2017) (discussing discovery of CRISPR-Cas9 technique for gene editing and its revolutionary
implications); SIDDHARTHA MUKHERJEE, THE GENE: AN INTIMATE HISTORY (Scribner 2016)
(examining history of genetic research and discovery from 1865 to the present).
163. See, e.g., William Lynch Schaller, Jumping Ship: Legal Issues Relating to Employee Mobility in High Technology Industries, 17 LAB. LAW. 25, 55-57 (2001) (discussing
trade secret “inevitable disclosure” doctrine in the context of mass raids involving such firms
as Wal-Mart, Amazon.com, Intel, Broadcom, McKesson and PeopleSoft); Mike Ramsey &
Douglas MacMillan, Uber Lures Robot Gurus From Carnegie Mellon, WALL ST. J., June 1,
2015, at A1 (reporting Carnegie Mellon’s crisis after losing 40 of its National Robotics Engineering Center’s top robotics researchers and scientists—6 principal investigators and 34 engineers—to Uber, which offered “bonuses of hundreds of thousands of dollars and a doubling
of salaries to staff the company’s new tech center in Pittsburgh.”).
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claim–apart from alleging breach of noncompetition covenants, Integrated
Genomics chose to bring only fiduciary disloyalty, unfair competition and
tortious interference claims, each “based on allegations that Kyrpides was
privy to Integrated Genomics’ proprietary information and that he left the
company to work for a competitor, where he helped to develop a competing
product and offered that product to Integrated Genomics’ customers.”164
Thus, Integrated Genomics squarely presented a fundamental question: Must
plaintiff endure ITSA preemption dismissal of all its information-based
claims even when it brings no trade secret claims?
Integrated Genomics was one of the few Illinois decisions to consider
this basic question and the first to do so in the aftermath of Hecny Transportation, an inquiry made all the more noteworthy by Integrated Genomics’
failure to “address this argument at all,” leaving the district court “with its
own research and the few citations provided by Kyrpides.”165 Judge Lefkow
quickly turned aside Kyrpides’ reliance on pre-Hecny Transportation district
court preemption decisions, citing Judge Grady’s observation in RTC Industries that “Hecny [Trasportation] depart[ed] from the broad preemptive effect applied in . . . prior cases”166 before concluding that “the liberal preemption doctrines stated in cases like Fox Controls, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc. have
been called into serious question by Hecny Transportation and can no longer
be cited as the unequivocal law in this circuit.”167 Judge Lefkow then noted
the statement in Hecny Transportation that “[a]n assertion of a trade secret
in a customer list does not wipe out claims of theft, fraud and breach of the
duty of loyalty that would be sound even if the customer list were a public
record”;168 she did not accept this statement without reservation, however,
choosing instead to qualify it with Judge Grady’s view in RTC Industries that
claims are still preempted when they rest on conduct that is said to constitute
misappropriation of trade secrets.169 Yet for all her seeming fidelity to precedent, in the end Judge Lefkow in Integrated Genomics explicitly chose to
follow Judge Kocoras’ total anti-preemption holding in Universal Imagine
Printing:170 “While Integrated Genomics cannot protect confidential information to the extreme of preventing its employees from being able to function after leaving its employee, Delta Med. Sys. v. Mid.-Am. Sys., Inc., 331
164. J.H. Chapman, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2256, at *8.
165. Id. at *10.
166. Id. at *11.
167. Id.
168. Id. at *11, n. 9.
169. J.H. Chapman, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2256, at *11.
170. Indeed, the district court quoted Judge Kocoras’ holding in Universal Imagine
Print: “If the information does not qualify as a trade secret, the availability of civil remedies
designed to address unlawful disclosure or use would be unaffected by ITSA [preemption].”
Integrated Genomics, 2008 WL 630605, *11 (quoting Universal Imagine Print, 2008 WL
62205, at *2).
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Ill. App.3d 777, 772 N.E.2d 768, 793 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2002), it may be
able to protect more than what would fit into the strict definition of a trade
secret.”171 For these reasons, Judge Lefkow refused to dismiss Integrated Genomics’ fiduciary duty of loyalty, tortious interference and unfair competition claims on ITSA preemption grounds.172
Jano Justice Systems, Inc. v. Burton,173 the first reported ITSA preemption opinion from the Central District of Illinois, authored by Judge Mills,
closed 2008 on an anti-preemption note. Burton was a 50% shareholder in
Jano Justice Systems, a firm that provided electronic data solutions to court
clerks and county officers, and Burton had access to Jano’s proprietary software, including its source code. While still a 50% owner and before resigning
as an employee of Jano, Burton set up a competing firm, hired away Jano’s
employees, solicited Jano’s customers, and even told customers he and his
new firm were affiliated with Jano. Judge Mills had no difficulty in finding
such conduct constituted breaches of fiduciary duty independent of Burton’s
alleged trade secret theft.174 He therefore denied Jano’s preemption motion
to dismiss solely on the authority of Hecny Transportation.
For all the talk of trade secret theft by foreigners in general and Chinese
in particular,175 no ITSA preemption case involved that fact pattern until early
171. Integrated Genomics, 2008 WL 630605, at *11.
172. Id. at *11-13.
173. Jano Justice Systems, Inc. v. Burton, 2008 WL 5191765 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 11, 2008)
(Mills, J.).
174. Id. at *2 (citing Hagshenas v. Gaylord, 199 Ill. App. 3d 60, 557 N.E.2d 316 (2d
Dist. 1990)). On fiduciary liability under the unusual Hagshenas opinion, see William Lynch
Schaller, Competing After Leaving: Fiduciary Duties of Illinois Closely Held Corporation
Shareholders After Hagshenas v. Gaylord, 84 ILL. B. J. 354 (1998).
175. See, e.g., TianRui Group Co. v. International Trade Commission, 661 F.3d 1322
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (Chinese firm TianRui hired away nine employees of American firm Amsted’s licensee in China in order to acquire 128 secrets relating to Amsted’s cast steel railway
wheel technology); CARL ROPER, TRADE SECRET THEFT, INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE, AND THE
CHINA THREAT (CRC Press 2014); Peter Loftus, Industrial Espionage Cases Soar in U.S.,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2017, at A1 (“FBI investigations and arrests for industrial espionage
and violations of export-control laws, predominantly linked to the Chinese government, rose
to an all-time high in 2015, according to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.”); Devlin Barrett, FBI to Use Spy Law to Battle Trade Theft, WALL ST. J., July 24,
2015, at A3 (“Because the Chinese government is tied to the wide-ranging effort to steal trade
secrets, U.S. authorities plan to increasingly use surveillance authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, often referred to as the FISA court, to conduct economic espionage
investigations, [Randall Coleman, the head of the FBI’s counterintelligence division] said.”);
Mark Mazzetti & Dan Levin, Obama Administration Warns Beijing About Covert Agents Ophttps://www.nyerating in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2015),
times.com/2015/08/17/us/politics/obama-administration-warns-beijing-about-agents-operating-in-us.html [https://perma.cc/466X-PZWS] (“According to the Chinese news media, Beijing has sent scores of security agents abroad to ‘persuade’ their targets to return home. Just
how they accomplish their aims is unclear, and questions have been raised about why a number
of suspects, presumably sitting on significant wealth abroad, have willingly returned to
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2009 in Motorola, Inc. v. Lemko Corp.176—a fact pattern that eventually resulted in the federal criminal conviction and four-year sentence of former
Motorola software engineer Hanjuan Jin.177 The circumstances were grim:
Jin and four other Chinese-born Motorola employees secretly began working
for Lemko, a rival located practically in Motorola’s backyard in suburban
Chicago, and over the course of years they stole source code and other proprietary data relating to cellular infrastructure, voice and data services and
other wireless communications technologies. Most of Judge Kennelly’s opinion was devoted to analyzing the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,178 but near
the end he addressed ITSA preemption in a single paragraph. One defendant,
Sheng, argued on a motion to dismiss that Motorola’s fiduciary duty claims
were preempted to the extent they were based on the same conduct that constituted Motorola’s ITSA claims. Judge Kennelly found this argument premature, noting that if “Motorola is ultimately unable to prove the existence of
a trade secret as defined by the ITSA, there would be no preemption.”179 He

China.”); Josh Chin, Jeremy Page, Alejandro Lazo & Adam Entous, Hunt for Chinese Man in
U.S. Fuels Intrigue: Brother of Top Aide to Former Beijing Leader—Who Diplomats and
Analysists Suspect Has Access to Sensitive Information – Hasn’t Been Seen Since October,
WALL STREET JOURNAL, Aug. 17, 2015, at A6 (“Spokesmen for the State Department and the
Justice Department said the U.S. is engaging with China on fugitives in the U.S. but insists on
credible evidence of criminal activity.”); Natasha Bertrand, The FBI Is Looking for a Star
Ohio State Professor with NASA Ties Who Disappeared, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 9, 2015),
https://www.businessinsider.com/chinese-ohio-state-professor-rongxing-li-disappeared2015-9 [https://perma.cc/P8WW-6YRW] (reporting disappearance of OSU Professor
Rongxing Li, who submitted a proposal to NASA to work on the Mars 2020 project, which
gave him access to Department of Defense information he was prohibited from sharing with
China); James A. “Sandy” Winnefeld, Jr., Cybersecurity’s Human Factor: Lessons from the
Pentagon, HARV. BUS. REV. 87 (Sept. 2015) (“The clear lesson is that people matter as much
as, if not more than, technology.”); Editorial, Beijing’s New World Order, WALL ST. J., Sept.
25, 2015, at A16 (“All of this amounts to perhaps the greatest theft in history. It has been
compounded in recent years by China’s attempts to require foreign firms to hand over proprietary technology as the price of doing business in China, a price those firms are increasingly
reluctant to pay.”).
176. 609 F. Supp. 2d 760 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2009) (Kennelly, J.). Motorola later
brought related litigation against the Huawei telecom group and “its founder, Ren Zhengfei, a
former officer in the People’s Liberation Army,” alleging they “began working with Chineseborn Motorola employees in as early as 2001.” Jamil Anderlini, Motorola Claims Espionage
in Huawei Lawsuit, FIN. TIMES, July 22, 2010.
177. See, e.g., Ameet Sachdev, Former Motorola Engineer Sentenced to Four Years
in Trade-Secret Case, CHI. TRIB., August 31, 2012. Jin’s conviction and sentencing were affirmed by the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Jin, 733 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2013).
178. See, e.g., Graham M. Liccardi, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: A Vehicle
for Litigating Trade Secrets in Federal Court, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 155
(2008) (discussing efforts to use the CFAA in trade secret cases and problems posed by such
statutory terms as “unauthorized access,” “exceeds authorized access,” “loss” and “damage”).
179. Motorola, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 771.
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cited only C.H. Robinson for this proposition,180 the very first case to consider Hecny Transportation and of course one in which preemption was
treated cautiously and narrowly.
EBI Holdings, Inc. v. Butler181 followed less than a week after Motorola
was published. Butler, a salesman for medical device company EBI, began
competing before quitting and then joined rival Blackstone. His fiduciary
misconduct ranged far beyond trade secret theft and included “arranging
meetings with Plaintiff’s customers to show off Blackstone products and selling Blackstone products.”182 Butler also “failed to return customer files and
documents in his possession,” leaving his former employer “at a serious competitive disadvantage because it did not have valuable historical customer and
sales information for Butler’s territory, resulting in loss of stimulator sales
business to Defendants and others.”183 Blackstone allegedly was “aware of,
encouraged and induced these breaches of fiduciary duty and duty of loyalty”
and “knowingly accepted benefits resulting from the breaches.”184 Thus, the
stage was set for EBI’s trade secret theft claims as well as its claims for inducing fiduciary disloyalty, tortious interference with Butler’s noncompete
contract, unjust enrichment, civil conspiracy, and tortious interference with
prospective economic advantage with customer relations.185 Judge Scott’s
opinion was interesting and unusual in that it was principally devoted to the
Blackstone defendants’ preemption arguments, although Butler joined in the
preemption motion to dismiss. She acknowledged Hecny Transportation and
recognized the parallels with Jano Justice Systems, the only other Central
District of Illinois opinion on ITSA preemption. Judge Scott in EBI Holdings
found ample allegations of conduct not dependent on trade secret theft and
therefore rejected the preemption arguments of the Blackstone defendants
and Butler.186 She specifically endorsed the holding in Judge Bucklo’s
Abanco opinion, observing that the unjust enrichment claim arising out of
stolen files and documents was “not restricted to claims arising out of the
misappropriation of trade secrets, but may potentially include other information that falls outside the ITSA definition of trade secret as well.”187
180.
181.

Id.
EBI Holdings, Inc. v. Butler, 2009 WL 400634 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 17, 2009) (Scott,

J.).
182. Id. at *4.
183. Id. at *5.
184. Id. at *4.
185. Assuming the pre-resignation competition and corporate opportunity usurpation
occurred and were encouraged as alleged, it was clear under Illinois law that Butler had
breached his fiduciary duties and that Blackstone was equally liable for inducing him to do
so. See William Lynch Schaller, Corporate Opportunities and Corporate Competition in Illinois: A Comparative Discussion of Fiduciary Duties, 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 16-17 (2012).
186. EBI Holdings, 2009 WL 400634, at *4-7.
187. Id. at *5.
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Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc. v. Chiquita Brands International,
Inc.188 came shortly after EBI Holdings. The by-now familiar fact pattern in
Del Monte involved a Del Monte employee emailing herself Del Monte documents shortly before resigning to join rival Chiquita Brands, triggering a
bevy of claims against her. Of relevance here was the court’s discussion of
ITSA preemption concerning Del Monte’s fiduciary duty claim against the
employee. Even though he rejected Del Monte’s trade secret claims on pricing and customer data for lack of confidentiality, Judge Hibbler allowed Del
Monte’s fiduciary duty claim to survive summary judgment with respect to
the downloaded documents. The court quoted RTC Industries, including that
case’s citation to Hecny Transportation,189 but primarily relied on the logic
of Combined Metals: “if the items at issue ‘fail to qualify as a trade secret,
how could the breach of fiduciary duty count be preempted under the ITSA?
Again, the ITSA preempts only counts premised on the misappropriation of
a trade secret.’”190 The Del Monte court also noted that Charles Schwab had
reached the same preemption result for the same reason on similar facts.191
After a brief lull preemption resurfaced in early 2011 in still another
ITSA opinion by Judge Pallmeyer, Carpenter v. Aspen Search Advisors,
LLC.192 The unremarkable facts showed Carpenter left employee recruiter
Aspen Search Advisors to form a competing firm, HR Pilots. Carpenter sued
Aspen for unpaid compensation, and Aspen responded with multiple counterclaims, including a breach of fiduciary duty claim that rested on Carpenter’s access to Aspen’s confidential information. Even though Carpenter was
decided after Hecny, Judge Pallmeyer took the same preemption approach
found in her earlier preemption opinions in Learning Curve Toys and Do It
Best: she followed Composite Marine Propellers and broadly ruled that
“[w]hether or not an ITSA claim is supported, the Act preempts related common law claims, such as this one.”193 She therefore dismissed the fiduciary
duty count.
Judge Shadur, the author of Nilssen in 1997 and later the author of Miller in 2012, weighed in again in mid-2011 in Stove Builders Int’l, Inc. v. GHP
Group, Inc.194 His Stove opinion was short and to the point and did not recite
the facts, as it came on the heels of an oral argument the day before on a
188. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc. v. Chiquita Brands International, Inc., 616
F. Supp. 2d 805 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (Hibbler, J.).
189. Id. at 822.
190. Id. 822-23 (quoting Combined Metals, 985 F. Supp. at 830).
191. Id. at 823.
192. Carpenter v. Aspen Search Advisors, LLC, 2011 WL 1297733 (N.D. Ill. April 5,
2011) (Pallmeyer, J.).
193. Id. at *2 (citing Composite Marine Propellers, Inc. v. Van Der Woude, 962 F.2d
1263, 1265 (7th Cir.1992)).
194. Stove Builders Int’l, Inc. v. GHP Group, Inc., 2011 WL 2183160 (N.D. Ill. June
3, 2011) (Shadur, J.).
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preemption motion to dismiss. So far as the opinion reveals, GHP attacked
Stove’s interference with prospective economic advantage theory in Count
IV as preempted because it rested on trade secret misappropriation facts.
Judge Shadur acknowledged Judge Moran’s AutoMed decision and Judge
Bucklo’s Abanco decision but chose not to decide whether and to what extent
those opinions conflicted on preemption. He instead resolved the dispute before him by noting that GHP had been arguing that Stove lacked trade secrets,
prompting him to conclude, “If GHP is right on that score, Count IV is not
preempted by the Act because “Trade Secret Information” would be an inaccurate characterization of the property interests it seeks to preserve.”195
A few weeks later came Fire ‘Em Up, Inc. v. Technocarb Equipment
(2004) Ltd.196 Another preemption motion to dismiss decision, Fire ‘Em Up
involved a charge that a licensee, Technocarb, was misusing licensor Fire
‘Em Up’s confidential training and materials to develop, promote and sell
Technocarb’s rival fuel device. Fire ‘Em Up alleged trade secret theft and
fraud, as well other claims not relevant to our discussion here, and the district
court considered preemption as to the fraud count. After dismissing Fire ‘Em
Up’s ITSA claim without prejudice on technical pleading grounds, Judge
Norgle highlighted the statements in Hecny Transportation that claims are
preempted by the ITSA “only when they rest on the conduct that is said to
misappropriate trade secrets” and that preemption “does not apply to duties
imposed by law that are not dependent upon the existence of competitively
significant secret information.”197 Judge Norgle had no trouble finding Fire
‘Em Up’s fraud claim was not dependent on trade secrets and thus avoided
preemption, as it was based in major part on Technocarb’s breach of the distributor agreement between the two companies.
A busy 2011 ended with another Central District of Illinois preemption
opinion, Tradesmen Int’l, Inc. v. Black,198 by Magistrate Judge Bernthal.
Tradesmen involved multiple employees, including Black, Walker and
Boyer, who broke away found a rival staffing company, Professional Labor
Services. All had noncompetition agreements, and all sought to honor those
contracts by locating their new firm in central Illinois and by declining business from Tradesmen customers. Their sole misstep was linked to Walker:
shortly before leaving Tradesmen, Walker sent five e-mails with “Modified
D & B Reports” attached to his personal e-mail account, and these reports
became the basis for a number of claims—including trade secret theft, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty and civil conspiracy—against all
195. Id. at *1.
196. Fire ‘Em Up, Inc. v. Technocarb Equipment (2004) Ltd., 799 F. Supp.2d 846
(N.D. Ill. June 27, 2011) (Norgle, J.).
197. Id. at 852 (quoting Hecny Transportation, 430 F.3d at 404-05).
198. Tradesmen Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 2011 WL 5330589 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 2011) (Bernthal, M.J.).
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defendants.199 Represented by the always-able Ken Vanko, defendants skillfully carved up Tradesmen’s claims on legal and factual grounds at summary
judgement, persuading Magistrate Judge Bernthal on the strength of Hecny
Transportation that the conversion, fiduciary breach and civil conspiracy
claims were preempted to the extent “they rest[ed] on the conduct that [wa]s
said to constitute misappropriation of trade secrets.”200 With Ken’s continued
assistance on appeal, defendants even became the first to prevail on an ITSA
bad faith fee claim tied solely to maintenance (as opposed to initiation) of a
trade secret theft action.201
A secrecy contract breach resulted in preemption arguments in Organ
Recovery Systems, Inc. v. Preservation Solutions, Inc.,202 a 2012 opinion in
which Judge Kennelly followed Hecny Transportation and even resurrected
Composite Marine Propellers. The facts were relatively unremarkable: After
signing a nondisclosure agreement, Organ Recovery shared its confidential
information with Preservation Solutions in an effort to bring to market roomtemperature chemical solutions to be used in preserving kidneys for transplants. However, Preservation Solutions and an affiliated firm, Bridge to
Life, later came out with a rival product, allegedly derived from Organ Recovery’s confidential information. Organ Recovery brought duty of loyalty,
deceptive trade practices, false advertising and civil conspiracy claims; the
defendants responded with an ITSA preemption motion to dismiss attacking
the last three claims.203 Relying on Hecny Transportation, the district court
ruled that Organ Recovery’s deceptive trade practices and false advertising
claims alleged defendants disparaged its products and lied about their own–
allegations that did not depend on trade secret misappropriation and hence
did not trigger preemption. As to the civil conspiracy charge, the district court
found it preempted because there were no “allegations of other bad acts by
199. Id. at *2.
200. Id. at *4.
201. See Tradesmen Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 724 F.3d 1004, 1016-17 (7th Cir. 2013).
202. Organ Recovery Systems, Inc. v. Preservation Solutions, Inc., 2012 WL 116041
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2012) (Kennelly, J.).
203. The district court rejected the duty of loyalty claim on the merits, ruling that
Preservation Solutions did not owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to Organ Recovery by virtue of
their confidentiality agreement alone. Id. at *4 (citing Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip
Cookie Co., Inc. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 280 (7th Cir. 1992)). “The fact
that OCR trusted PSI to abide by their contract does not create a fiduciary relationship.” Id. at
*5 (citing Yokel v. Hite, 348 Ill. App. 3d 703, 707, 809 N.E.2d 721, 725 (5th Dist. 2004)).
This view stands in marked contrast to some cases suggesting noncompete agreements extend
fiduciary duties after the employment or agency relationship ends. See, e.g., Integrated Genomics, 2008 WL 630605, *10 (“The court notes, however, that a restrictive covenant may
create an ongoing fiduciary duty even after an employee leaves a company.”) (citing Jostens,
Inc. v. Kauffman, 842 F. Supp. 352, 354 (C.D. Ill. 1994) (citing in turn Composite Marine
Propellers, 962 F.2d 1263, 1265 (7th Cir. 1992)).
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the defendants beyond the taking of confidential information.”204 The district
court relied in part on the Court of Appeals’ broad statement in Composite
Marine Propellers that “unless defendants misappropriated a (statutory)
trade secret, they did no legal wrong.”205 As further support, the district court
contrasted the holdings in CardioNet and EBI Holdings for and against
preemption, respectively, based upon the presence or absence of facts showing conduct beyond mere trade secret misappropriation.206
I have covered Judge Shadur’s 2012 opinion in Miller UK v. Caterpillar, Inc.,207 and I will skip the district court’s 2013 decision in Spitz v. Proven
Winners North America, LLC208 since it did not rule on preemption, even
though it ultimately resulted in the Seventh Circuit’s Spitz preemption opinion in 2014. So I turn to Judge St. Eve’s 2013 offering in Lumenate Technologies, LP v. Integrated Data Storage, LLC.209 There, in essence, Integrated
Data Storage (IDS) raided Lumenate’s staff, some of whom downloaded data
and destroyed computer evidence as they “covered their tracks” before departing Lumenate.210 Lumenate alleged actual and threatened trade secret
theft, including an inevitable disclosure claim under PepsiCo Inc. v. Redmond,211 but the preemption question turned on IDS’ alleged interference
with the ex-employees’ Lumenate nondisclosure agreements. In considering
the motion to dismiss before her, Judge St. Eve acknowledged both her prior
opinion in Charles Schwab and the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Hecny
Transportation. She then framed the question as “whether Lumenate’s tortious interference claim against IDS would stand even if the information that
the Individual Defendants allegedly misappropriated from [Lumenate] does
not constitute trade secrets.”212 She first noted that the contractual definition
of “confidential information” was essentially identical to the ITSA’s definition of “trade secret” and thus concluded that there could be no interference
unless the information was a trade secret—bringing the claim squarely within
the ambit of the ITSA’s preemption provision, she thought. Judge St. Eve did
not discuss or cite the contrary opinions of Judge Conlon in CardioNet and
of the Seventh Circuit in Epic Systems, both of which held that tortious interference claims are not preempted.213
204. Organ Recovery Systems, 2012 WL 116041, at *9.
205. Id. (quoting Composite Marine Propellers, 962 F.2d at 1265).
206. Id.
207. Miller UK v. Caterpillar, Inc., 859 F. Supp.2d 941 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (Shadur, J.).
208. Spitz v. Proven Winners North America, LLC, 969 F. Supp.2d 994 (N.D. Ill. Aug.
22, 2013) (Hart, J.).
209. Lumenate Technologies, LP v. Integrated Data Storage, LLC, 2013 WL 5974731
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 11, 2013) (St. Eve, J.).
210. Id. at *5.
211. PepsiCo Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995).
212. Lumenate Tech., 2013 WL 5974731 at *7.
213. See infra notes 240-41.
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The year 2014 brought five new preemption decisions before the Seventh Circuit handed down Spitz. The first, Montel Aetnastak, Inc. v.
Miessen,214 involved employees who learned of their employer Montel’s confidential effort to develop a relationship with a department store chain and
the confidential information Montel generated in connection with its attempt
to sell its specially-adapted mobile shelving product to that chain. Chief
Judge Castillo found Montel’s claim of tortious interference with the department store opportunity preempted because all that was alleged was use of
confidential information in diverting the opportunity, but he concluded that
part of a fiduciary duty claim and part of a civil conspiracy survived, under
Hecny Transportation, to the extent they were not based exclusively on the
misappropriated confidential information.215 Chief Judge Castillo did
acknowledge in dicta, though, that ITSA preemption would not apply to nonconfidential information.216 In the second case, Covenant Aviation Security,
LLC v. Berry,217 Judge Bucklo continued to adhere to this view as well, explicitly holding that the breach of fiduciary duty claim there, to the extent it
was based on information not rising to the level of a trade secret, escaped
preemption on a motion to dismiss under her interpretation of Hecny Transportation—a holding consistent with her earlier opinions in Bagley and
Abanco.
The last three 2014 cases before Spitz, all decided on motions to dismiss,
were SSB Worldwide, Inc. v. Potts,218 Global Material Technologies, Inc. v.
Dazheng Metal Fibre Co., Ltd.,219 and Arvegenix, LLC v. Seth.220 Potts involved a global freight logistics and supply chain solutions firm salesman,
Potts, who took files and transferred data to his new employer before quitting.
Judge Holderman held the ITSA preempted all common law claims dependent on the allegedly misappropriated trade secrets, though he followed Hecny
214. Montel Aetnastak, Inc. v. Miessen, 998 F. Supp.2d 694 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (Castillo,
C.J.).
215. Even though all of the district decisions discussed thus far were decided under
Erie diversity principles, the district court opinion in Montel Aetnastsak was the first to cite
the preemption holding in the Illinois Appellate Court’s decision in Alpha School Bus Co.,
Inc. v. Wagner, 391 Ill. App. 3d 722, 910 N.E.2d 1134 (1st Dist. 2009). Montel Aetnastak, 998
F. Supp. 2d at 720.
216. Montel Aetnastak, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 720 (“While Plaintiffs are correct that the
ITSA does not preempt non-confidential information, they have wholly failed to offer any
argument that their claim is not based upon misappropriation of confidential information.”).
217. Covenant Aviation Security, LLC v. Berry, 15 F.Supp.3d 813 (N.D. Ill. 2014)
(Lefkow, J.)
218. SSB Worldwide, Inc. v. Potts, 2014 WL 499001 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 2014) (Holderman, J.).
219. Global Material Technologies, Inc. v. Dazheng Metal Fibre Co., Ltd., 2014 WL
1099039 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2014) (Dow, J.).
220. Arvegenix, LLC v. Seth, 2014 WL 1698374 (C.D. Ill. April 29, 2014) (McDade,
J.).
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Transportation in sustaining a fiduciary duty claim based on the allegation
that Potts “intentionally undermined SBS’s business by quoting prices to
SBS customers that Potts knew would incur substantial losses.”221 Global
Material Technologies concerned what many consider to be the standard Chinese playbook—developing a close and seemingly interdependent relationship with an American firm, learning the American firm’s most confidential
manufacturing and customer information, transferring all manufacturing and
technology to China so the American firm becomes increasingly dependent
on the Chinese supplier for production, then squeezing the American firm on
pricing and production, and finally, completely cutting off the American firm
and openly competing.222 Judge Dow approved the ITSA claims but found
all other business torts claims preempted, as they rested on the trade secret
misappropriation allegations and nothing more.223 Arvegenix presented the
sad but standard story of a firm sharing its secrets in attempting to recruit
investors, in that case for its pennycress agribusiness, only to see the investors dump the firm and start a rival. Judge McDade examined Hecny Transportation and then held that all business torts claims tied to trade secret misappropriation were preempted, but left open the possibility that some of the
business tort claims could be re-alleged without reliance on trade secrets.224
IV. FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT OPINIONS AFTER SPITZ V.
PROVEN WINNERS NORTH AMERICA, LLC
The Seventh Circuit in Spitz of course reset the test in favor of total
preemption without acknowledging its earlier decisions in either Hecny
Transportation or Composite Marine Propellers. One would expect Spitz to
play a decisive role going forward and it quickly did.
I put aside First Financial Bank, N.A. v. Bauknecht,225 the first district
court preemption decision after Spitz, as Judge McDade didn’t even note
221. Potts, 2014 WL 499001, at *8.
222. See, e.g., PAUL MIDLER, POORLY MADE IN CHINA: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE
CHINA PRODUCTION GAME (John Wiley & Sons 2009); JAMES MCGREGOR, NO ANCIENT
WISDOM, NO FOLLOWERS: THE CHALLENGES OF CHINESE AUTHORITARIAN CAPITALISM
(Prospecta Press 2012); Administration Strategy on Mitigating the Theft of U.S. Trade Secrets,
(Feb.
2013)
WHITEHOUSE.GOV,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/IPEC/admin_strategy_on_mitig
ating_the_theft_of_u.s._trade_secrets.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5CY-YAEN].
223. Global Materials Technologies, 2014 WL 1099039, at *6-7.
224. Arvegenix, 2014 WL 1698374, at *7-9 (dismissing tortious interference, unfair
competition and unjust enrichment claims as preempted, but allowing re-pleading of the tortious interference claims in Counts III and IV because they were “not necessarily premised on
secret information, and would be viable even if the information Plaintiffs allege[d] Defendants
used had been public information.”).
225. Bauknecht, 71 F. Supp.3d 819 (C.D. Ill. 2014) (McDade, J.).
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Spitz in Bauknecht. Judge McDade instead continued to follow the Hecny
Transportation passage asking whether a claim is “dependent upon the existence of competitively significant secret information” as the test for
preemption and then granted summary judgment in favor of preemption with
respect to customer, farming guide, and soil map information offered under
a conversion theory.226 Despite his failure to mention Spitz, Judge McDade
reached the total preemption result demanded by Spitz: “[p]laintiff should not
be permitted to do an end-run around the ITSA in this case and present a
conversion claim based upon competitively secret information if it cannot
succeed in its ITSA claim.”227 Judge McDade tried to obey Hecny Transportation, too, however, as he later held that preemption did not apply to physical
documents the defendants had taken, if plaintiff was not claiming trade secret
status as to them.228
The two remaining cases capture the preemption debate in its entirety,
with Spitz proving determinative. Cronimet Holdings, Inc. v. Keywell Metals,
LLC,229 a 2014 opinion by Judge Ellis, arose from a bidding battle between
Cronimet and Keywell over the assets of a firm that employed Newman and
Joyce. Although Keywell won the auction for the assets in a bankruptcy sale,
it lost Newman and Joyce, both of whom joined Cronimet. Much of Judge
Ellis’ opinion was preoccupied with the assignability of their employment
contracts, but Newman and Joyce also argued the ITSA preempted Keywell’s
claims for misappropriation of confidential information, unfair competition,
and unjust enrichment. Keywell responded that preemption did not apply
“because its claim for misappropriation of confidential information [wa]s for
information that d[id] not rise to the level of a trade secret.”230 Judge Ellis
noted the tension surrounding the proper understanding of Hecny Transportation as applied to such “not rising to the level of a trade secret” claims,
citing as examples Judge Shadur’s anti-preemption opinion in Miller and the
pro-preemption opinions of Chief Judge Castillo in Montel Aetnastak and
Judge Grady in RTC Industries.231 But Judge Ellis found Spitz controlling:
“Illinois courts have read the preemptive language in the ITSA to cover
claims that are essentially claims of trade secret misappropriation, even when
the alleged ‘trade secret’ does not fall within the Act’s definition.”232
226. Id. at 848 (quoting Hecny Transportation, 430 F.3d at 405).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 849 (“If First Financial is not claiming that the documents that Graymont
and Bauknecht have in their possession, including cash flow statements, financial reports, note
modifications, mortgage extensions, and business loan agreements, are trade secrets, its conversion claim can proceed to trial.”).
229. Cronimet Holdings, Inc. v. Keywell Metals, LLC, 73 F. Supp.3d 907 (N.D. Ill.
2014) (Ellis, J.).
230. Id. at 919.
231. Id. at 919-20.
232. Id. at 920 (quoting Spitz, 759 F.3d at 733).
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Accordingly, she granted the preemption motion to dismiss as to the confidential information, unfair competition, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy claims tied to allegedly stolen information.233
The final chapter to this story was written by Judge Tharp in 2015 in
Market Track, LLC v. Efficient Collaborative Retail Marketing, LLC.234 Two
market data tracking firms fought there over patent and trade secret claims,
and the case was before the district court on preliminary injunction and judgment on the pleadings motions. As Market Track did not move for a preliminary injunction on its ITSA claim, the district court addressed such relief
solely on Market Track’s tortious interference claim. With no way to escape
Spitz, Market Track chose “to denigrate the quality of the Seventh Circuit’s
analysis.”235 As an inferior court in a hierarchal system, Judge Tharp would
have none of that.236 He also explicitly rejected Market Track’s assertion that
Hecny Transportation addressed the status of information not rising to the
level of a trade secret, observing that Hecny Transportation “focused on the
nature of the duty the tortfeasor was alleged to have violated, and endorsed
the view that where a duty exists without regard to whether a breach involved
information that was worthy of protection under the Trade Secrets Act (whatever the scope of that act’s protection), the ITSA does not preempt the
claim.”237 Finally, in a first impression ruling Judge Tharp held that Market
Track’s tortious interference claim tied to customer nondisclosure agreements was also preempted. For this he cited the broad holding in Composite
Marine Propellers that “Illinois abolished all common law theories of misuse
of [secret] information”238 and noted that the ITSA’s definition of “misappropriation” by “improper means” encompasses “breach or inducement of a
breach of a confidential relationship or other duty to maintain secrecy or limit
use.”239 Judge Tharp distinguished the Seventh Circuit’s anti-preemption tortious interference holding in IDX Systems Corp. v. Epic Systems Corp.240 on
the ground that IDX Systems involved Wisconsin law,241 without citing the
contrary district court opinion in CardioNet taking the opposite view of IDX
Systems.

233. Id. at 920.
234. Market Track, LLC v. Efficient Collaborative Retail Marketing, LLC, 2015 WL
3637740 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2015) (Tharp, J.).
235. Id. at *17.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at *18 (quoting Composite Marine Propellers, 962 F.2d at 1265).
239. Market Track, 2015 WL 3637740, at *18 (quoting 765 ILCS 1065/2(a) and (b)).
Cf. Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015) (defendant’s good faith
belief that an asserted patent is invalid is not a defense to an induced infringement claim under
35 U.S.C. §271(b)).
240. IDX Systems Corp. v Epic Systems Corp., 285 F.3d 581 (7th Cir. 2002).
241. CardioNet, 2008 WL 567223, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2008) (Conlon, J.).
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V. ALL AD HOC, ALL THE TIME
It must have been a struggle writing all these district court opinions; it
certainly was a struggle writing about them. The story they tell is one of intellectually honest district court judges trying to do their duty with regard to
a wide array of fact patterns and claims governed by Illinois law. Yet if we
look closely, the cases and claims they confronted largely follow a basic
theme: one-time or would-be business associates became competitors locked
in a zero-sum game, pursuing each other’s business opportunities, customers,
employees, technology, or some combination of these. Competition in and of
itself is a good thing, of course, but unfair competition is not. Drawing the
line between the two can be difficult, especially early in a case when the facts
are relatively undeveloped, with different facts triggering different claims.
Making matters worse, most often the attacks in these cases were led by former employees, former partners or former agents, all of whom were fiduciaries at one time and most likely still were at the time of their alleged wrongdoing, meaning they almost certainly owed a duty of loyalty and confidence
independent of any contract or trade secret claim.
If we distill these cases still further, they can be grouped along an even
simpler axis–those that were based on competitively significant information
and those that were not. Those that were not should never have been the subject of ITSA preemption debate from any point of view. Hecny Transportation was properly dismissive of just such a preemption argument with respect
to “files, computers, software and other office equipment,”242 holding that an
employee’s theft of physical property and other defalcations before resigning
have nothing to do with trade secrets and everything to do with fiduciary
duties. But this issue was so obvious that only Sherwood, Thermodyne,
Thomas & Betts, and Dick Corp. even felt the need to address it before Hecny
Transportation and no case has done so since.
By far the harder question, at least as these district courts conceived it,
was the fate of competitively significant information not rising to the level of
a trade secret. This issue surfaced repeatedly in one of three ways: (1) plaintiff alleged a statutory trade secret claim that was defective for some reason,
most often for failure to take affirmative secrecy measures but occasionally
because the contested information was generally known or in the public domain; (2) plaintiff brought a competitive information claim but elected not to
bring a trade secret claim; or (3) plaintiff alleged a viable statutory trade secret claim that overlapped other claims involving competitive information.
These are actually easy issues once the relationship between Section
8(a) and Section 8(b) is properly understood by reading them together under
traditional statutory construction canons, as Judge Alesia’s opinion in Combined Metals and Shadur’s opinion in Miller amply illustrate. On their view,
242.

Hecny Transportation, 430 F.3d at 404.
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information doesn’t need to rise to the “trade secret” level to trigger claims
established under Illinois law and preserved under Section 8(b)(2). Judge
Marovich’s opinion in EarthDweller, Judge Bucklo’s opinion in Bagley, and
Judge St. Eve’s opinion in Charles Schwab all reached the same result based
on their reading of Section 8(a) alone. They each noted that Section 8(a)’s
displacement of “conflicting” remedies based on a “trade secret” required a
conflict that could not arise if the information in question did not meet the
“trade secret” standard. Under either the Combined Metals/Miller approach
or the EarthDweller/Bagley/Charles Schwab approach, the three inquiries
outlined above are irrelevant; the presence or absence of statutory trade secret
claims has no bearing on non-trade secret claims.
Other districts courts struggled, however, in their search for a workable
standard under the weight of the Seventh Circuit’s opinions in Composite
Marine Propellers and Hecny Transportation. For example, with only Composite Marine Propellers (1992) as a guide, Judge Conlon suggested in J.H.
Chapman (1996) that all claims resting on “commercially valuable information” were preempted, while Judge Pallmeyer in Learning Curve Toys
(1999) believed preemption was mandated whenever “the operative facts are
arguably cognizable under the ITSA.” Judge Moran in AutoMed (2001) was
of the view that to warrant preemption, “core” facts had to show misuse of
an actual trade secret in common with a statutory trade secret claim. Magistrate Judge Denlow in Lucini Italia (2003) thought the non-trade secret
claims had to be “inextricably intertwined” with the trade secret claims to be
preempted. Judge Aspen in Dick Corp. (2004) said “misappropriation of
ideas” was the test.
The district court judges’ standards changed with Hecny Transportation
(2005) before them. Judge Hart in Dominion Nutrition (2006) noted the tension between Learning Curve Toys and AutoMed but didn’t need to resolve
it. Judge Grady in RTC Industries (2007) offered this guideline: “After Hecny
Transportation, the test for a non-ITSA claim is not whether the plaintiff
arguably could have brought an ITSA claim. Rather, the test is whether the
plaintiff’s claim would lie if the information at issue were non-confidential.”243 Judge Lefkow in Integrated Genomics (2008) largely followed Judge
Grady’s lead in RTC Industries, but she added a slight twist of her own, allowing plaintiff there “to protect more than what would fit into the strict definition of a trade secret.”244 Judge Conlon in CardioNet (2008), however, said
the test was whether the challenged claims rested on “competitively significant information.” Judge Hibbler in Del Monte (2009) could barely make
sense of it all: “if the items at issue ‘fail to qualify as a trade secret, how could
the breach of fiduciary duty count be preempted under the ITSA? Again, the
243.
244.

RTC Industries, 2007 WL 2743583, at *3.
Integrated Genomics, 2008 WL 630605, at *11.
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ITSA preempts only counts premised on the misappropriation of a trade secret.’”245 Judge Norgle in Fire ‘Em Up (2011), by contrast, had no difficulty
in extracting the proper measure, quoting verbatim from Hecny Transportation in saying that claims are preempted by the ITSA “only when they rest
on the conduct that is said to misappropriate trade secrets” and that preemption “does not apply to duties imposed by law that are not dependent upon
the existence of competitively significant secret information.”246 Judge St.
Eve in Lumenate Technologies (2013) framed the question in slightly different terms: “whether Lumenate’s tortious interference claim against IDS
would stand even if the information that the Individual Defendants allegedly
misappropriated from [Lumenate] does not constitute trade secrets.”247
Why did these district courts flounder so much? I’d say it’s because
Composite Marine Propellers and Hecny Transportation skipped traditional
statutory construction principles and offered no public policy justifying
preemption or non-preemption. Composite Marine Propellers simply declared that “[u]nless defendants misappropriated a (statutory) trade secret,
they did no legal wrong”248—with no further explanation. Hecny Transportation, in turn, was concerned with physical asset theft and pre-resignation
fiduciary duty claims that had nothing to do with stolen information. In its
attempt to justify its “intuition” about such claims escaping preemption, the
Court of Appeals in Hecny Transportation did reference the UTSA (“The
dominant view is that claims are foreclosed only when they rest on the conduct that is said to misappropriate trade secrets.”249) and the Uniform Law
Commissioners’ comments (“The [provision] does not apply to duties imposed by law that are not dependent upon the existence of competitively significant secret information, like an agent’s duty of loyalty to his or her principal.”), but these were asides divorced from the facts of the case. The Seventh Circuit in Hecny Transportation didn’t actually say it was adopting
these UTSA standards, if they can be called standards in the first place. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit did not offer uniformity with other states as a policy
consideration in Hecny Transportation.250 To be sure, Composite Marine
245. Del Monte, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 822-23 (quoting Combined Metals, 985 F. Supp.
at 830).
246. Fire ‘Em Up, 799 F. Supp.2d at 852 (quoting Hecny Transportation, 430 F.3d at
404-05).
247. Lumenate Technologies, 2013 WL 5974731 at *7.
248. Composite Marine Propellers, 962 F.2d at 1265.
249. Hecny Transportation, 430 F.3d at 404-05.
250. Id. at 404. The Seventh Circuit in Hecny Transportation made the partially true
but incomplete statement that “the Illinois Trade Secrets Act is based on the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act of 1985,” without noting the ITSA’s many departures from the UTSA–departures
that required the ITSA to omit the uniformity clause. See Melvin F. Jager, Illinois Returns to
the Mainstream of Trade Secret Protection, CHI. B. REC. 18, 18-21 (Oct. 1988) (discussing
ITSA’s numerous departures from the Uniform Trade Secrets Act in order to maintain, restore
and codify Illinois common law).
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Propellers and Spitz offered no policy grounds for favoring or disfavoring
preemption in any particular case, nor did the Illinois Appellate Court in
Pope, upon which Spitz relied.
VI. CONCLUSION
This punishing exercise reflects a reality. With no clearly articulated
public policy to follow, the Northern District of Illinois (and the Central District of Illinois, too) ended up ruling in every direction until Spitz, sometimes
citing Composite Marine Propellers, sometimes citing Hecny Transportation, sometimes citing both, and sometimes citing neither. The inevitable result was ad hoc adjudication, despite the conscientious efforts of all the district court judges surveyed here.
Their opinions teach a deeper truth: Illinois law has long accommodated
a far wider range of claims than just trade secret misappropriation in cases
involving sharp dealing. Many of those I illustrated in my earlier piece, and
many more were on display in the cases examined here, whether from the
Northern District of Illinois or the Central District of Illinois. All presented
close relationships come undone, and all presented claims cognizable under
Illinois law—at least absent ITSA preemption.
The Seventh Circuit in PepsiCo rightly held that Section 8(a) of the
ITSA abolishes common law claims for trade secret misappropriation and
replaces them with statutory trade claims for secret misappropriation. With
the exception of PepsiCo, the remaining Seventh Circuit preemption decisions are a house of cards, as are the Illinois Appellate Court’s ITSA preemption decisions. None of them recites Illinois’ long history of common law
claims, none of them engages in proper statutory construction analysis, and
none of them offers a public policy for or against preemption. After over
thirty years of silence, it’s time for the Illinois Supreme Court to speak.

